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The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a school voucher initiative that offers publicly-
funded scholarships to students from economically-disadvantaged families to attend a 
participating private school of their choice. While school choice theory suggests that market-
based reforms such as the LSP should improve student outcomes, experimental evaluations of 
the program instead find significant negative effects of the program on math and reading scores 
after its first year. Those effects diminish to insignificant differences by the end of the third year 
before becoming negative again in the fourth year. Our study builds on previous work with an 
exploratory analysis of the variation in treatment effects across 13 school characteristics in the 
first four years of the program. In general, we do not observe effect heterogeneity across school 
characteristics, though we find evidence suggesting students who preferred larger schools, 
schools with higher tuition, and schools with longer school days experienced more favorable 
impacts from participating in the LSP relative to their peers who did not prefer such schools. 
 
 Keywords: school vouchers, school choice, student achievement, heterogeneous effects, 
mediators of education effects  
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HETEROGENEOUS IMPACTS ACROSS SCHOOLS IN THE FIRST FOUR YEARS OF 
THE LOUISIANA SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 
 
Private school choice programs, which provide families with public funds to attend 
private schools of their choosing, are among the most controversial education reform initiatives 
in the United States. Proponents argue that school voucher or scholarship programs expand 
educational options available to families, thereby optimizing the possibility of a match between 
students’ educational needs with school offerings, all while improving the education system as a 
whole through increased competition among schools for students (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hoxby, 
2003). Opponents argue choice programs harm traditional public schools and their students by 
stripping away funding and concentrating disadvantaged, non-choosing students within their 
walls (Gutmann, 2003; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2013). 
However, the evidence on the achievement effects of private school voucher programs1 is 
mixed, with slightly more studies reporting positive results than negative. Overall, the most 
rigorous empirical research indicates null or small positive impacts of vouchers on student 
achievement with noticeable, yet non-systematic variation in treatment effects across student 
subgroups as moderators (Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf, 2016). Lesser 
known is the extent to which school characteristics mediate treatment effects. After all, school 
choice is a general policy; the particular form that school choice takes for students and families 
depends upon the specific schools chosen. In this paper, we address this question by examining 
how treatment effects vary across schools participating in one of the nation’s first statewide 
school voucher initiatives, the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP). 
                                                 
1 There are other forms of private school choice, including tax credit scholarships, education savings accounts, 
and tuition rebates. However, as the Louisiana Scholarship Program is a voucher program, our primary focus for the 
literature review will be on private school voucher programs. For more details on other forms of private school 
choice, we encourage the reader to consider EdChoice’s 2019 volume, The ABCs of School Choice. 
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This paper builds on the private school choice literature by examining how LSP impacts 
vary across school environments. Specifically, we conduct an analysis focused on students 
experiencing the initial statewide expansion: the 2012-13 application cohort. Following the work 
of Mills (2015) and Mills and Wolf (2017a; 2017b; 2019), our analysis is restricted to eligible 
applicants who experienced an oversubscription lottery in order to calculate unbiased estimates 
of the impact of LSP voucher usage on student achievement. We then explore how these 
estimated treatment effects vary across 13 school characteristics, which include the school’s 
religious affiliation, geographic location, tuition, enrollment, demographics, staffing, and 
instructional intensity. We also conduct tiered analysis for nine of those characteristics. Tiered 
analysis groups students based on key school characteristics that can be measured continuously 
as opposed to just categorically. 
In general, we do not find much evidence of variation in LSP impacts on English 
Language Arts (ELA) and math outcomes. In terms of school setting, we find some evidence that 
students preferring schools in an urban setting experienced favorable math impacts relative to 
students preferring schools in a suburban, town, or rural setting. Tuition charged by the private 
school, the number of full-time teachers or equivalents on employed by the school, and the total 
K-12 enrollment of the school tended to be positively associated with math outcomes. Schools 
enrolling a larger percentage of African American or LSP students had less favorable math 
outcomes in the first year relative to schools with the smallest proportions of these students. 
Finally, we find that math outcomes after the first year were positively associated with the 
number of instructional hours per school day or per school year, but not with the number of 
school days per year. These findings deepen our understanding of how the LSP impacted both 
students and the education system in Louisiana as a whole.  
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This work offers two contributions to the literature on private school choice programs. 
First, our analysis examines a statewide program. While the majority of choice programs in the 
U.S. have been concentrated in urban locales, the number of programs serving entire states has 
grown in recent years, and now includes programs in Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, and 
Ohio, in addition to Louisiana. Given this expansion, it is important to understand how these 
programs work on a state level, as we expect to see increased variation in school characteristics 
across an entire state when compared to programs concentrated in a single city. Understanding 
how this variation relates to voucher effects can provide guidance to future policymakers.  
Second, our analysis builds on a highly rigorous causal design. Placement in an LSP 
school was determined by random lottery, so effect estimates for students applying to a first-
choice school with a shared characteristic (e.g. Catholic or non-Catholic) support strong causal 
inferences. Thus, our study is the first analysis to provide scholars and policy makers with causal 
estimates of the impact of attending specific types of private schools with the aid of a school 
voucher. However, results regarding effect heterogeneity are merely exploratory, as such 
estimates are endogenous with unobserved characteristics that led students to sort themselves 
into particular first-choice school lotteries (e.g. Catholic relative to non-Catholic).  
Our report proceeds as follows. First, we summarize the theories and existing literature 
on achievement impacts of school voucher programs in the United States in general and their 
heterogeneous effects in particular. Next, we describe the structure of and research on the 
Louisiana Scholarship Program. We then outline our methodology, describing our sample of 
students and analytical strategy. After presenting the results of our analysis, we conclude with a 
discussion of our findings and their implications for the program. 
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Relevant Theoretical and Empirical Literature on School Choice 
An extensive scholarly literature exists on the theory behind and effects of private school 
choice programs. Here we highlight a few works that are most relevant to this specific study. 
Theories of school choice 
Political philosophers Thomas Paine (1791) and John Stuart Mill (1962 [1869]), as well 
as economist Milton Friedman (1955), developed the theory backing K-12 school choice 
interventions. A primary claim of school choice proponents is that, while government should 
offer funds in support of compulsory education mandates, it does not need to deliver the 
education itself (Friedman, 1955). School choice theory posits that choice will improve student 
academic outcomes by allowing families to seek out the schools that best meet their child’s 
needs and by incentivizing schools to compete for students (Friedman, 1955; Moe, 2005). 
Other scholars theorize that private school programs will have negative effects on student 
achievement. They claim that public schools have a comparative advantage over private schools 
in boosting test scores (Lubienski & Lubienski, 2013); that parents will make bad schooling 
choices for their children (Lauder & Hughes, 1999; Smith & Meier, 1995); or, that private 
schools are especially ineffective at educating the kinds of disadvantaged students targeted by 
voucher programs (Fuhrer 2013). These competing claims about the achievement effects of 
school vouchers amount to testable hypotheses.   
Empirical evidence on the effects of voucher programs on student achievement 
School voucher programs, in which students receive publicly-funded vouchers or 
scholarships to attend a participating private school of their choosing, represent one form of 
private school choice (Wolf, 2008). Egalite and Wolf (2016) note voucher programs can differ 
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along at least five dimensions: region served (cities or entire states), eligibility (means-tested or 
universal), level of regulation, voucher value, and number of vouchers available. As of January 
2019, there were 56 private school choice programs in the United States (EdChoice, 2019).2 A 
majority of these are means-tested and 19 are primarily or exclusively targeted to students with 
disabilities. Most of the programs open to general education students are operated at the local 
rather than the state level.  
The most rigorous research focusing on the effects of voucher programs on student 
achievement reports mixed results, though results are more often positive than negative. A recent 
meta-analysis of all experimental evaluations of U.S. programs indicates small positive effects of 
vouchers on student math and reading achievement when averaged across all programs that are 
not statistically significant (Shakeel, Anderson & Wolf, 2016). This overall finding masks 
considerable heterogeneity across programs, with evaluations of Charlotte’s Children’s 
Scholarship Fund (Greene, 2001; Cowen, 2008) as well as early experimental evaluations of the 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1999; Rouse, 1998) finding 
statistically significant gains in ELA, math, or both subjects. In contrast, experimental or quasi-
experimental evaluations of voucher programs in Louisiana (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 
2018; Mills & Wolf, 2019), Washington, D.C. (Wolf et al., 2013; Dynarski, Rui, Webber, 
Guttman, & Bachman, 2017), Indiana (Waddington & Berends, 2018), and Ohio (Figlio & 
Karbownik, 2016) report statistically significant negative impacts of voucher programs on 
student achievement, particularly in math.  
The achievement effects of voucher programs vary not only across programs, but also 
within programs. Several studies report differential effects by ethnicity (Howell, Wolf, 
                                                 
2 We exclude personal tax deduction/credit programs from this count because they are individual tax benefits 
and not “programs.” 
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Campbell, & Peterson, 2002; Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin, 2003; Howell & Peterson, 
2006; Jin, Barnard, & Rubin, 2010), ability (Bitler, Domina, Penner, & Hoynes, 2015), or quality 
of sending school (Wolf et al., 2013). Krueger and Zhu (2004) is the rare case of a voucher 
achievement study that finds no evidence of effect heterogeneity across any student subgroups. 
Effects can also vary over time (Wolf & Egalite, forthcoming), either diminishing (Howell & 
Peterson, 2006; Wolf et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2013) or improving with time (Witte et al., 2014; 
Mills & Wolf, 2017b; Waddington & Berends, 2018).  
Effect heterogeneity across school characteristics 
The above studies all examine how student characteristics might “moderate” school 
choice achievement effects. Lesser known, however, is how voucher treatment effects vary 
across school characteristics defined as “mediators.” Choice proponents often argue school 
choice programs will promote a diverse and innovative education system as schools attempt to 
cater to family educational desires (Hoxby, 2003). Therefore, it seems plausible to expect 
increased variation in school characteristics in a system with school choice. The extent to which 
increased variation in school characteristics affects student achievement patterns in specific 
programs, as well as in general, is less clear. 
Unfortunately, the research base examining how private school characteristics mediate 
student academic outcomes is limited. There is some evidence suggesting different types of 
private schools can impact student outcomes. Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore (1981) find that 
students attending Catholic schools were more likely to graduate or enroll in college than their 
public school peers, especially if they belonged to a racial minority group. Correlational 
evidence from Wolf and Hoople’s (2006) study of the Washington (DC) Scholarship Fund 
suggests less extensive school facilities, more homework, and more involved teachers are all 
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related to positive voucher effects. Waddington and Berends (2018) find positive effects in ELA 
for students using Indiana’s Choice Scholarship Program to attend Catholic schools compared to 
negative effects for other voucher users. They also examine if treatment effects vary across 
urban, suburban, and rural schools, reporting only small differences.  
Effects may also vary with school enrollment. Low performance, low enrollment, and 
greater probability of a private school closing tend to be correlated with each other (McShane, 
Kisida, Jensen, & Wolf, 2012). Effects may depend on the extent to which a given school is 
reliant on the LSP to maintain enrollment. School choice theory predicts families will respond to 
low-quality schools by moving to other options (Friedman, 1955). One would expect larger 
negative effects for LSP students accessing low-quality schools that would have otherwise closed 
in the absence of the program. Declining enrollment prior to the start of the voucher program 
may serve as a helpful proxy in identifying these schools.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which voucher effects are mediated by school characteristics 
is an empirical question that, to date, has been rarely examined. Our analysis adds to this scant 
research by examining if voucher effects vary systematically across types of schools 
participating in the LSP. 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program Design and Prior Research 
Initially created as a pilot program in New Orleans in 2008, the Louisiana State 
Legislature expanded the program statewide for the 2012-13 school year by passing Act 2 in 
2012. The program is limited to students (1) with family income at or below 250 percent of the 
federal poverty line who also are (2) entering kindergarten or attending a public school that was 
graded C, D, or F for the prior school year according to the state’s school accountability system 
or a school in the Recovery School District (RSD). During the years covering this report, 2012-
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13 through 2015-16, the RSD included most of the public schools in the city of New Orleans, 
several in Baton Rouge, and a single school in Shreveport, Louisiana. In the program’s first year, 
9,736 students were eligible applicants, a majority of them outside New Orleans. 
The LSP voucher is worth 90% of the amount the state and local governments provide in 
student funding to the local school system or the tuition charged by the student’s chosen private 
school, whichever is less. Tuition at participating private schools ranged from $2,200 to $14,500, 
with a mean of $5,494 and a median of $5,045 in the first year, substantially lower than the 
average per pupil revenue of $12,220 in Louisiana’s traditional public schools. Participating 
private schools must accept the voucher as full value for tuition, even if the value of the voucher 
is less than the tuition charged. 
Private schools must meet certain criteria to participate in the program involving 
admissions, financial practice, student mobility, and the health, safety, and welfare of students. A 
survey of participating and non-participating private schools in Louisiana suggests that concern 
about present and future program regulations have influenced schools’ participation decisions 
(Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015). Experimental studies in Florida (DeAngelis, Burke, & 
Wolf, 2018) and California and New York (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 2019) find that open-
enrollment mandates and state standardized testing requirements reduce the likelihood that a 
private school leader is interested in participating in a voucher program. Taken together, these 
studies may explain why only a third of eligible private schools opted into the program in 2012-
13. Private school participation in the LSP has increased slightly since that time. 
Eligible applicants to the 2012-13 cohort could list up to five private school preferences 
when applying to the program. The Louisiana Department of Education then used a matching 
algorithm similar to the deferred acceptance lottery used in New York City (Abdulkadiroglu, 
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Pathak, & Roth, 2005) to allocate LSP scholarships to students. The algorithm prevents gaming, 
incentivizing families to reveal their true school preference rankings. It attempts to place students 
into their top ranked school while accounting for placement priorities.3  
In cases of oversubscription to a specific school in the program,4 the LSP matching 
algorithm randomly assigns students to receive or not to receive an LSP private school placement 
to that particular school. Recent evaluations of the Louisiana Scholarship Program use these 
oversubscription lotteries for students’ first-choice schools to estimate the impact of LSP 
scholarship usage on student achievement. Separate studies examining achievement impacts after 
one year report statistically significant negative impacts of voucher usage on student 
achievement in reading, math, science, and social studies (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak & Walters, 
2018; Mills, 2015). These negative effects diminish over time, with math effects roughly halved 
after two years (Mills & Wolf, 2017a) and not statistically significant after three years (Mills & 
Wolf, 2017b). However, effect estimates on both ELA and math become negative again in the 
fourth year (Mills & Wolf, 2019). The results are heterogeneous based on moderator 
characteristics, with negative effects persisting for younger students in math and statistically 
                                                 
3 The LSP scholarships are awarded according to the following guidelines. First, students with disabilities and 
“multiple birth siblings,” siblings who are twins, triplets, etc., are manually awarded LSP scholarships if there is 
available space at their preferred school. Remaining students are assigned one of six priorities: 
Priority 1 – Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are applying to the same 
school; 
Priority 2 – Non-multiple birth siblings of Priority 1 awardees in the current round; 
Priority 3 – Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are applying to a different 
school; 
Priority 4 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “D” or “F” grade in Louisiana’s school 
accountability system at baseline; 
Priority 5 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “C” grade; 
Priority 6 – New applicants who are applying to kindergarten. See Mills & Wolf (2017a) for further information 
on the LSP matching process. 
4 Oversubscription lotteries occurred when there were more students applying to a given grade in a given school 
who were members of the same priority category than seats available (Mills & Wolf, 2017a). 
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significant positive effects observed for students performing in the bottom third of the ELA 
distribution at baseline (Mills & Wolf, 2017b). 
Methodology 
We focus in this paper on describing how the impact on achievement after the first four 
years of using an LSP scholarship to attend a private school varied across different school 
settings for the 2012-13 cohort. In doing so, we build on two components of an ongoing 
evaluation of the LSP: studies examining the impact of the program on participant achievement 
(Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2018; Mills, 2015; Mills & Wolf 2017a; Mills & Wolf, 2017b; Mills & 
Wolf, 2019) and Sude, DeAngelis, and Wolf’s (2018) examination of the types of private schools 
that opted to participate in the LSP. Given the strikingly negative estimates of the program’s 
effect on student achievement after one year (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2018; Mills, 2015), and 
subsequent partial recovery of that lost ground, it is important to determine if and how school 
characteristics mediated these outcomes. 
Data 
The data for this analysis come from several sources. The Louisiana Department of 
Education (LDE) provided student-level demographic data, testing data,5 and application 
information for all eligible LSP applicants.6 The LDE additionally provided information on LSP 
                                                 
5 This study uses student performance on the Louisiana state assessments in grades three through eight as our 
primary outcome measure of interest. The Louisiana program of assessments offers two alternative assessments for 
students with disabilities. Performance on these assessments is excluded from our analysis. All students participating 
in the LSP are required to be tested by their private schools, using the state accountability assessments, for any grade 
in which the public school system also tests its students. The 2011-12 (baseline), 2012-13, and 2013-14 assessment 
data in our study contain student scores on the LEAP and iLEAP exams, criterion-referenced tests aligned to 
Louisiana state education standards. For more information, see Mills (2015). In 2014-15, Louisiana instead 
administered Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC), a criterion-referenced test 
aligned with the Common Core standards, in ELA and math. Our year three results represent student performance on 
these assessments. For more information, see Mills and Wolf (2017b). 
6 For more information, see Mills and Wolf (2017a). 
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participating schools, which we have supplemented with data from the Private School Universe 
Survey (PSS) and reviews of school websites.7 
Analytical strategy 
Our analysis builds on the work of Mills (2015) and Mills and Wolf (2017a; 2017b; 
2019) which leverage oversubscription lotteries occurring during the process of matching LSP 
applicants to schools for the 2012-13 school year. The analyses use the outcome of 
oversubscription lotteries as an instrument to predict actual enrollment in an LSP school, and use 
predicted enrollment to produce unbiased estimates of the program’s Local Average Treatment 
Effect (LATE) on student achievement (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Cowen, 2008; Mills & Wolf, 
2017b; Mills & Wolf, 2019). Our analysis expands on this work by interacting predicted LSP 
enrollment with school characteristics in the original evaluation’s two stage least squares (2SLS) 
model: 
(1a) 𝑈𝑖 = ∑𝜋𝑗
1𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝛿1
1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿2
1(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑆𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖′𝛽
1 + 𝑢𝑖 
1  
(1b) (𝑈𝑖 × 𝑆𝑖) = ∑𝜋𝑗
1𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝛿1
2𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿2
2(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑆𝑖) + 𝑋𝑖′𝛽
2 + 𝑢𝑖 
2 
(2) 𝐴𝑖 = ∑𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝜏1𝑈?̂? + 𝜏2(𝑈 × 𝑆𝑖̂ ) + 𝑋𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖 
where i denotes student, j denotes first-choice school lottery, and: 
 𝑈𝑖 indicates if a student used an LSP scholarship to enroll in an LSP-participating private 
school in the 2012-13 school year;8 
                                                 
7 The PSS is a biennial survey intended to collect data on all private schools in the United States meeting the 
National Center for Education Statistics definition of private schools. While the intent is to be comprehensive, the 
survey does not include data for all private schools in Louisiana or participating in the LSP. We use data from the 
2013-14 PSS to conduct our analysis. For more information, see Sude, DeAngelis, and Wolf (2018). 
8 Prior evaluations of school voucher programs have examined enrollment effects in several ways. For example, 
Mayer et al. (2002) define enrollment as being “consistently enrolled in a private school,” while Rouse (1998) 
defines enrollment as the number of years enrolled in an attempt to capture potential dosage effects. By defining 
enrollment as “ever attending a private school,” our study falls in line with the Wolf et al. (2013) evaluation of the 
DC Opportunity Scholarship Program. 
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 𝑅𝑖 is a fixed effect for a student’s first-choice school lottery;
9 
 𝑇𝑖 indicates if a student received an LSP scholarship to their first-choice school; 
 𝐴𝑖 is standardized student mathematics or ELA achievement in year one, two, three, or 
four of the program;10 
 𝑋𝑖′ is a vector of student characteristics, including achievement, collected either at 
baseline (2011-12) or from the student’s LSP application form; and 
 𝑆𝑖 is a particular school characteristic of interest, including school’s religious affiliation, 
geographic location, school tuition, enrollment, student-teacher ratio, instructional hours, 
and student demographics. 
The 2SLS procedure first estimates two equations to generate one’s predicted likelihood 
of using a scholarship to attend an LSP school (1a) and an interaction of this prediction with the 
school characteristic of interest (1b). These predicted values are then used to produce unbiased 
estimates of the distribution of LATEs across school characteristics (2).11 The estimate 𝝉𝟏 
indicates the experimental impact of using an LSP scholarship to attend a private school that 
does not have characteristic 𝑆𝑖. Adding 𝝉𝟏 and 𝝉𝟐 provides the experimental impact of using an 
LSP scholarship to attend a private school that does have characteristic 𝑆𝑖. 𝝉𝟐 itself estimates the 
difference in the LSP effect between students randomly placed in a private school with 
                                                 
9 We include a fixed effect for first-choice school lottery to account for differing probabilities of success across 
lotteries (Gerber & Green, 2012). By using fixed effects, we are essentially comparing lottery winners and losers 
within the same first-choice school strata to calculate unbiased estimates of the effect of being randomly offered an 
LSP scholarship. The approach is comparable to analyzing the impact of hundreds of “mini-experiments” and 
aggregating the results across them. 
10 Student achievement scores are standardized using distributional parameters of outcomes from the control 
group. 
11 The 2SLS procedure effectively treats students who lose their first-choice lottery but go on to win an LSP to a 
lower school preference as control-group crossovers. The result is an unbiased estimate of the effect of using a LSP 
scholarship to attend one’s first-choice school for those who both faced and complied with their lottery assignment 
for placement in their first-choice school (Bloom & Unterman, 2014). 
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characteristic 𝑆𝑖 and students randomly placed in a private school without characteristic 𝑆𝑖. The 
significance test on 𝝉𝟐 determines if the impact of the LSP is heterogeneous or not with respect 
to characteristic 𝑆𝑖. We additionally account for nesting of students within lotteries with cluster-
adjusted bootstrapped standard errors (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Analytical sample 
We examine variation in LSP achievement effects across schools by focusing on a 
subsample of LSP applicants who experienced oversubscription lotteries for their first-choice 
school in 2012-13. Our analytical sample is restricted to students with baseline achievement data 
in grades three through seven in 2011-12 who additionally had outcome data in grades four 
through eight in 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15, or 2015-16. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics 
for the 899 LSP applicants meeting these criteria for our Year 4 analysis. Nearly 90 percent of 
students in our analytical sample are identified as African American. The overwhelming majority 
of students in our sample are free- or reduced-price lunch eligible and are performing at least 35 
percent of a standard deviation below the state average on the Louisiana assessments across all 
subjects at baseline, when they applied to the program. These patterns are similar in the first 
three years of our analysis. 
The adjusted difference (column 4) compares the characteristics of LSP applicants 
experiencing the same lottery for their most preferred private school. The general lack of 
significant differences in these more refined comparisons indicates that students receiving an 
LSP scholarship by lottery (Treatment) are very similar on nearly every characteristic included to 
those who do not (Control). This pattern gives us strong assurance that the LATEs underlying 
our mediator analysis are calculated with high internal validity. 
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Characteristics of schools participating in the LSP 
This report examines how LSP achievement effects vary for this analytical sample across 
schools. Research by Sude, DeAngelis, and Wolf (2018) indicates private schools opting to 
participate in the LSP had lower enrollment, lower tuition, tended to serve more minority 
students, and were more likely to be Catholic schools than Louisiana private schools that opted 
not to participate. Table 2, which compares the characteristics of participating and non-
participating LSP schools for the 2012-13 school year respectively, is consistent with their 
analysis. 
Overall, we observe several statistically significant differences between Louisiana private 
schools choosing to participate in the LSP and those choosing not to participate. In 2012-13, 
private schools that chose to participate in the LSP relative to private schools that chose not to 
participate were more likely to be religious (10.8 percentage points), Catholic (22.6), and 
coeducational (7.5). They charged almost $850 less for tuition and staffed 7.5 fewer full-time 
equivalents on average. In terms of enrollment characteristics, LSP schools were smaller (87.6 
students) and enrolled a greater percentage of African American students (32 percentage points). 
Their school year was slightly longer (1.7 days), but the length of the school day was roughly the 
same.  
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Characteristics of LSP applicants for Year 4 analysis 
 
n Winners Losers 
Adjusted 
Difference 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 899 0.54 0.49 0.03 0.04 0.53 
Ethnicity       
African American 899 0.87 0.89 -0.00 0.03 0.87 
Hispanic 899 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.62 
White 899 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.97 
Other 899 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.43 
LEP 899 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.86 
FRL 730 0.94 0.95 -0.00 0.02 0.97 
# of choices 899 1.89 2.34 -0.18* 0.10 0.07 
Baseline Testsa       
ELA 899 -0.33 -0.35 -0.01 0.08 0.93 
Math 898 -0.34 -0.36 -0.03 0.08 0.66 
Science 898 -0.45 -0.45 0.02 0.06 0.77 
Social Studies 898 -0.37 -0.37 -0.01 0.07 0.92 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Scores are standardized within grade based on the observed distributions of scale scores across 
Louisiana. Analysis sample excludes students with disabilities and multiple birth siblings. The analysis sample 
represents LSP applicants to grades four through eight in 2012-13 who did not list a special education exclusion on 
their LSP application and were not multiple birth siblings. The analysis sample is additionally restricted to 
students with baseline in grades three through four. Treatment refers to students receiving LSP scholarships to 
their first-choice private school. All other students comprise the control group. Demographics are drawn from the 
2011-12 testing data. Adjusted Diff is the difference between Treatment and Control group students, controlling for 
first-choice school lottery fixed effects. “Standard error” indicates standard error of the difference, which accounts 
for clustering within lotteries. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Characteristics of LSP participating schools, 2012-13 
 







 N Mean  N Mean  (2) - (4) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) 
Religious 87 96.6%  197 85.8%  10.8*** 0.04 0.007 
Catholic 87 67.8%  197 45.2%  22.6*** 0.06 0.000 
Non-Catholic Religious 87 28.7%  197 40.6%  -11.9* 0.06 0.056 
Coeducational 87 98.9%  197 91.4%  7.5** 0.03 0.017 
Urban 87 49.4%  197 42.1%  7.3 0.06 0.256 
Tuition 83 $5,385.74  157 $6,235.65  -$849.91* 432.01 0.050 
Full Time Equivalents 87 21.0  196 28.5  -7.5*** 2.70 0.005 
Student/Teacher Ratio 87 13.0  196 12.6  0.4 0.55 0.465 
Total K-12 Enrollment 87 276  197 363  -87.6*** 33.08 0.009 
School Year Days 86 178.8  197 177.2  1.7** 0.77 0.030 
School Day Hours 87 7.1  197 7.0  0.1 0.06 0.159 
Total Instructional Hours 86 1268.3  197 1240.4  27.9** 12.87 0.031 
Demographics    
 
     
% Native American 87 0.15%  194 0.96%  -0.01 0.73 0.272 
% Asian 87 1.87%  194 2.49%  -0.01 0.61 0.313 
% Hispanic 87 2.31%  194 4.08%  -1.77* 1.07 0.099 
% African American 87 44.16%  194 12.16%  32.00*** 3.61 0.000 
% Pacific Islander 87 0.05%  194 0.25%  -0.21** 0.09 0.031 
% Two or more 87 0.98%   194 1.97%   -1.00 0.78 0.202 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Notes. “Standard error” means standard error of the difference. “LSP” refers to private schools that chose to participate in the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program. “Non-LSP” refers to private schools that chose not to participate in the Louisiana scholarship Program. The number of full-time equivalent teachers 
is the sum of all teachers who taught full time, plus 0.875 times the number of teachers who taught between at least ¾ time but less than full-time, plus 0.625 
times the number of teachers who taught at least ½ time but less than ¾ time, plus 0.375 times the number of teachers who taught at least ¼ time but less than 
½ time, plus 0.125 times the number of teachers who taught less than ¼ time. 
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Characteristics of schools enrolling LSP students 
Next, we look to see if there is any variation in school characteristics among LSP 
participating private schools. Tables 3-6 examine the distributions of school characteristics for 
LSP schools in which one or more LSP students enrolled in the first four years of statewide 
expansion. Several of the characteristics examined here demonstrate meaningful variation. The 
range for tuition is quite large, with a low of $2,200 and a high of $14,500. Enrollment, 
student/teacher ratios, and the number of days in a school year also vary strongly across schools. 
On the other hand, several variables demonstrate limited variation. For example, only 3 percent 
of all participating private schools are non-religious and, among religious schools, the 
overwhelming majority are Catholic. Similarly, nearly all participating private schools are 
coeducational. The limited variation for these categories suggests that non-religious and single-
gender schools are outliers in the set of LSP schools. Therefore, we recommend caution when 
generalizing findings for these categories. 
Over the course of four years, the schools in which LSP students enrolled did not change 
much for most characteristics, with some notable exceptions. LSP students tended to enroll in 
larger and more expensive schools and in schools in which African American or LSP students 
composed a smaller share of the student population over the course of the first four years of the 
program. This trend is not driven by a dramatic shift in one part of the distribution as values at 
the mean, median, 33rd percentile, and 66th percentile generally shifted upwards over the three 
years. 
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Table 3.                 
                 
Measures of central tendency and variation in schools in which LSP students enrolled, 2012-13 
    






    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Religious  86  0.97  0.18           
Catholic  86  0.67  0.47           
Non-Catholic Religious  86  0.29  0.46           
Coeducational  86  0.99  0.11           
Urban  86  0.50  0.50           
Tuition  82  $5,394  1,788  $2,200  $14,500  $5,045  $4,538  $5,581 
Full-Time Equivalents  86  21.0  15.8  3.0  86.1  15.6  12.2  20.9 
Student/Teacher Ratio  86  13.0  3.7  3.8  22.9  13.3  11.1  14.6 
Total K-12 Enrollment  86  275  206  26  912  205  159  272 
% African American  86  44.60%  0.41  0.24%  100.00%  26.80%  9.05%  84.32% 
% LSP  87  25.19%  0.27  0.15%  100.00%  11.11%  4.88%  30.75% 
School Year Days  85  178.8  6.4  151  223  178  177  180 
School Day Hours  86  7.1  0.5  5.5  9  7  7  7.1 
Total Instructional Hours  85  1,268.0  118.9  974  2,007  1,260  1,241  1,274 
                                  Notes. Mean of binary variables indicates the proportion of schools that identify with that characteristic. “Religious Non-Catholic” schools include all 
religious schools that do not identify as Catholic, including Muslim, Jewish, and several Protestant denominations. A “0” for “Religious Non-Catholic” would 
indicate that the school is either Catholic or non-religious. The number of full-time equivalents is the sum of all teachers who taught full time, plus 0.875 
times the number of teachers who taught between at least ¾ time but less than full-time, plus 0.625 times the number of teachers who taught at least ½ time 
but less than ¾ time, plus 0.375 times the number of teachers who taught at least ¼ time but less than ½ time, plus 0.125 times the number of teachers who 
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Table 4.                 
                 
Measures of central tendency and variation in schools in which LSP students enrolled, 2013-14     
    






    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Religious  88  0.94  0.23           
Catholic  88  0.65  0.48           
Non-Catholic Religious  88  0.30  0.46           
Coeducational  88  0.99  0.11           
Urban  88  0.51  0.50           
Tuition  84  $5,454  1,748  $2,825  $14,500  $5,191  $4,597  $5,605 
Full-Time Equivalents  88  21.1  15.9  3.0  86.1  15.8  12.0  21.5 
Student/Teacher Ratio  88  12.8  3.6  3.8  22.9  13.3  11.0  14.5 
Total K-12 Enrollment  88  276  210  26  912  209  157  282 
% African American  88  44.29%  0.41  0.24%  100.00%  24.68%  9.44%  81.63% 
% LSP  84  21.18%  0.22  0.15%  78.46%  10.75%  5.60%  33.43% 
School Year Days  87  179.1  5.6  161  223  178  177  180 
School Day Hours  88  7.1  0.5  5.5  9  7  7  7.1 
Total Instructional Hours  87  1,267.8  116.7  974  2,007  1,260  1,239  1,274 
                                  Notes. Mean of binary variables indicates the proportion of schools that identify with that characteristic. “Religious Non-Catholic” schools include all 
religious schools that do not identify as Catholic, including Muslim, Jewish, and several Protestant denominations. A “0” for “Religious Non-Catholic” would 
indicate that the school is either Catholic or non-religious. The number of full-time equivalents is the sum of all teachers who taught full time, plus 0.875 
times the number of teachers who taught between at least ¾ time but less than full-time, plus 0.625 times the number of teachers who taught at least ½ time 
but less than ¾ time, plus 0.375 times the number of teachers who taught at least ¼ time but less than ½ time, plus 0.125 times the number of teachers who 
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Table 5.                 
                 
Measures of central tendency and variation in schools in which LSP students enrolled, 2014-15     
    






    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Religious  87  0.94  0.23           
Catholic  87  0.66  0.48           
Non-Catholic Religious  87  0.29  0.46           
Coeducational  87  0.99  0.11           
Urban  87  0.52  0.50           
Tuition  83  $5,470  1,752  $2,825  $14,500  $5,200  $4,613  $5,621 
Full-Time Equivalents  87  21.3  15.9  3.0  86.1  15.9  12.1  22.0 
Student/Teacher Ratio  87  12.9  3.6  3.8  22.9  13.3  11.0  14.6 
Total K-12 Enrollment  87  279  209  26  912  211  161  290 
% African American  87  43.65%  0.40  0.24%  100.00%  23.76%  9.28%  79.28% 
% LSP  83  16.86%  0.17  0.13%  60.21%  8.91%  4.30%  21.54% 
School Year Days  86  179.0  5.7  161  223  178  177  180 
School Day Hours  87  7.1  0.5  5.5  9  7  7  7.1 
Total Instructional Hours  86  1,270.4  115.0  974  2,007  1,260  1,242  1,274 
                                  Notes. Mean of binary variables indicates the proportion of schools that identify with that characteristic. “Religious Non-Catholic” schools include all 
religious schools that do not identify as Catholic, including Muslim, Jewish, and several Protestant denominations. A “0” for “Religious Non-Catholic” would 
indicate that the school is either Catholic or non-religious. The number of full-time equivalents is the sum of all teachers who taught full time, plus 0.875 
times the number of teachers who taught between at least ¾ time but less than full-time, plus 0.625 times the number of teachers who taught at least ½ time 
but less than ¾ time, plus 0.375 times the number of teachers who taught at least ¼ time but less than ½ time, plus 0.125 times the number of teachers who 
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Table 6.                 
                 
Measures of central tendency and variation in schools in which LSP students enrolled, 2015-16     
    






    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Religious  81  0.95  0.22           
Catholic  81  0.65  0.48           
Non-Catholic Religious  81  0.30  0.46           
Coeducational  81  0.99  0.11           
Urban  81  0.53  0.50           
Tuition  78  $5,510  1,762  $2,825  $14,500  $5,222  $4,639  $5,654 
Full-Time Equivalents  81  21.5  16.2  3.0  86.1  15.9  12.1  22.0 
Student/Teacher Ratio  81  13.0  3.6  3.8  22.9  13.3  11.2  14.6 
Total K-12 Enrollment  81  280  208  26  912  211  170  291 
% African American  81  42.95%  0.40  1.72%  100.00%  23.76%  9.29%  72.68% 
% LSP  78  13.34%  0.14  0.13%  56.31%  6.62%  3.69%  14.80% 
School Year Days  80  179.1  5.8  161  223  178  177  180 
School Day Hours  81  7.1  0.5  5.5  9  7  7  7.2 
Total Instructional Hours  80  1,275.5  117.2  974  2,007  1,260  1,246  1,275 
                                  Notes. Mean of binary variables indicates the proportion of schools that identify with that characteristic. “Religious Non-Catholic” schools include all 
religious schools that do not identify as Catholic, including Muslim, Jewish, and several Protestant denominations. A “0” for “Religious Non-Catholic” would 
indicate that the school is either Catholic or non-religious. The number of full-time equivalents is the sum of all teachers who taught full time, plus 0.875 
times the number of teachers who taught between at least ¾ time but less than full-time, plus 0.625 times the number of teachers who taught at least ½ time 
but less than ¾ time, plus 0.375 times the number of teachers who taught at least ¼ time but less than ½ time, plus 0.125 times the number of teachers who 
taught less than ¼ time. Total instructional hours is the total number of hours per day multiplied by the number of days per year and does not adjust for partial 
days. 
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A note on causality 
Some of the results we are about to present are causal while others are merely 
correlational and therefore exploratory. Our subgroup effect estimates represent the causal 
impact of a student using an LSP voucher to attend a school with a specific characteristic 
compared to a student seeking access to a private school with that characteristic but being denied 
access to it through the lottery’s results. Our estimates of LSP impacts by school characteristic 
subgroups are causal because they focus on students who faced lotteries for placement in their 
first-choice private school, with the assistance of an LSP voucher. Students were seeking 
enrollment in a specific school with particular features. The lottery therefore determined which 
students among eligible LSP applicants to a specific school could actually experience those 
particular school characteristics and which applicants would be placed in the randomized control 
group. The LSP placement lottery is the first private school choice lottery with which we are 
familiar that randomly assigned students to experience or not experience particular private school 
characteristics. Therefore, the extent to which those school features systematically predicted 
positive or negative LSP achievement outcomes represents experimental, and therefore causal, 
associations.  
On the other hand, our results regarding impact heterogeneity based on variation in 
school characteristics are not causal. They are, instead, exploratory because any differences 
between the causal impacts of the LSP on students due to differences in specific school 
characteristics could be caused by the school feature but also could be due to different 
populations of students preferring schools of choice with different characteristics. Since a 
mediation study like this one cannot untangle those two effects, we make clear throughout the 
study that our assessment of the extent to which LSP impacts vary by school characteristics is 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3376234 




correlational and therefore exploratory. Comparisons across lotteries, e.g. comparing the effects 
for students who preferred religious schools relative to those who preferred nonsectarian schools, 
do not necessarily support causal inferences. 
Results 
We examine effect heterogeneity in the first four years of the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program’s statewide operation, exploring how various school characteristics could behave as 
mediators for student outcomes on Louisiana’s state assessments in ELA and math. Our findings 
generally do not indicate that LATEs varied strongly across school settings over those four years. 
Parents and students of their own volition choose which schools to list as their preferences rather 
than being assigned schools randomly, and because of this selection into different lotteries, we 
emphasize again that this analysis has a causal component and a descriptive component. The 
former, which relies on the gold standard randomization used in Mills and Wolf’s (2019) four-
year evaluation of the LSP, is limited to the LATE impact estimates of schools with particular 
characteristics. The latter centers on the differences between LATE estimates by school 
characteristics, which could be endogenous with unobserved student characteristics that lead 
students to sort themselves into different lotteries. 
By the third and fourth year, many of our instruments do not satisfy Staiger and Stock’s 
(1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument, a first-stage regression with an F-statistic equal to 
or greater than 10. The main reason for this limitation is diminishing rates of compliance with 
lottery assignment by the third and fourth year of the program (Sude & Wolf, 2019). 
Furthermore, effect estimates should be interpreted conservatively given the 
heteroskedastic structure of our error term due to lottery clusters. Since Staiger and Stock (1997) 
advised a rule of thumb for instrumental variables analysis, further literature has been developed 
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for both homoskedastic (Stock & Yogo, 2005) and heteroskedastic settings (Montiel Olea & 
Pflueger, 2013; Montiel Olea, Pflueger, & Wang, 2013; Andrews, Stock, & Sun, 2018). This 
research encourages the calculation of effective F-statistics (FEFF), as even our bootstrapping of 
the standard errors does not sufficiently correct for problems introduced by multiple endogenous 
regressors. However, no industry-wide consensus has been formed on how to deal with multiple 
endogenous regressors in a heteroskedastic setting with panel data. Therefore, we continue to 
report which instruments fail to satisfy Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb for a strong 
instrument and encourage the reader to interpret those results with caution. 
Effect estimates that rely on instruments that fail to satisfy Staiger and Stock’s (1997) 
rule are shaded in gray. Our preferred models control for a vector of student characteristics. Full 
results, including results from the simple model, can be found in the Appendix Tables A9-A24. 
Outcomes by religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting 
Table 7 provides our first look at the extent to which LSP impacts are differentiated by 
religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting. The table presents results for both ELA 
(columns 1, 3, 5, and 7) and math (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) outcomes. The estimates in this table 
rely on our “Student Characteristics” model, which controls for student-level demographics. 
We begin by considering a school’s religious status (sectarian or secular), coeducational 
status (coeducational or single-gender), and urbanicity (whether located in an urban setting or in 
one of three alternatives: suburb, town, or rural) and find only one statistically significant 
difference in the achievement impacts of the LSP across four years. In the second year, students 
who preferred schools in an urban setting scored 0.61 standard deviations higher on the 
standardized math exam relative to their peers who preferred a school in a suburb, town, or rural 
setting (p < 0.05). We do not find statistically significant differences for students preferring 
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religious schools to non-religious schools or Catholic schools to non-Catholic schools (including 
religious non-Catholic schools) on either ELA or math impacts of the LSP. 
By the third year, most instruments fail to satisfy Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of 
thumb for a strong instrument, thus providing unreliable descriptive estimates of any impact 
differences based on the religious status, coeducational status, or urbanicity of preferred schools. 
For full results by religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting, please see Appendix 
Tables A9, A13, A17, and A21. 
Outcomes by school tuition and staffing 
Next, we consider variation in LATE estimates by school tuition and staffing 
characteristics (Table 8). Effects on math outcomes were positively associated with the number 
of full-time equivalents staffed by a school. Students who preferred schools with an additional 10 
full-time equivalents above the mean (approximately 21 FTE over the four years of analysis) 
experienced LSP math impacts that were 0.11 standard deviations higher at the end of the first 
year than their peers who preferred a school at the mean (p < 0.01). That association between 
higher staffing levels of the preferred private school and better (i.e. less negative) math impacts 
persisted into the second year (0.11 standard deviations, p < 0.10) and grew in the third year 
(0.29, p < 0.10). By year four, the lottery instrument used in the first stage of the model was too 
weak of a predictor of voucher use to yield a reliable result. 
Other differences in LSP impacts by school characteristics were either not statistically 
significant, and thus indistinguishable from zero, or relied on instruments that failed to satisfy 
Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb for instrument relevance. For full results by school  
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Table 7.             
             
Variation in LATE estimates by religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting    
    2012-13   2013-14   2014-15   2015-16 
  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Religious, relative to non-religious n 1,772 1,772  1,551 1,550  1,172 1,171  715 703 
τ2 0.13 0.14  -0.06 0.15  0.43 0.32  1.10 -0.66 
 (0.21) (0.28)  (0.45) (0.48)  (1.47) (2.14)  (21.55) (50.51) 
μ 0.84  0.84   0.86  0.86   0.89  0.89   0.88  0.88  
                          
Catholic, relative to non-Catholic n 1,772 1,772  1,551 1,550  1,172 1,171  715 703 
τ2 0.01 -0.23  -0.11 -0.34  -0.13 -1.04*  0.43 -0.78 
 (0.13) (0.18)  (0.23) (0.28)  (0.48) (0.61)  (1.23) (1.47) 
μ 0.52  0.52   0.55  0.55   0.57  0.57   0.58  0.59  
                          
Coeducational, relative to single-
gender 
n 1,772 1,772  1,551 1,550  1,172 1,171  715 703 
τ2 0.21 0.15  0.07 0.36  0.54 0.27  1.47 -0.21 
 (0.22) (0.28)  (0.44) (0.52)  (0.94) (1.19)  (23.05) (61.35) 
μ 0.83  0.83   0.85  0.85   0.88  0.88   0.88  0.89  
                          
Urban, relative to suburban, town, or 
rural 
n 1,772 1,772  1,551 1,550  1,172 1,171  715 703 
τ2 0.00 0.21  -0.02 0.61**  -0.11 -0.25  -0.31 -0.11 
 (0.14) (0.18)  (0.23) (0.26)  (0.43) (0.62)  (1.35) (2.41) 
μ 0.49  0.49   0.51  0.51   0.52  0.52   0.53  0.53  
                          * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. All effect estimates rely on "Student Characteristics" model. "Religious" schools 
include all Catholic schools, Christian but non-Catholic schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy 
Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A1, A3, A5, and A7). For full results, see Appendix 
Tables A9, A13, A17, and A21. 
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tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio, please see Appendix Tables 
A10, A14, A18, and A22. 
Outcomes by school enrollment and demographics 
When exploring how LATE estimates vary across enrollment characteristics, we find 
evidence that math impacts were positively associated with the total enrollment of a school 
(Table 9). Students who preferred schools with an additional 100 students above the mean ( = 
275-280 students over the four years of analysis) experienced LSP impacts 0.10 standard 
deviations higher in math after one year than their peers who preferred a school at the mean (p < 
0.01), an association that persisted into the second year (0.11 standard deviations, p < 0.05). The 
association grew in the third year (0.21, p < 0.10), though the estimate relied on a weak 
instrument (Stock & Staiger, 1997). By the fourth year both the instrument and the association 
are too weak to draw conclusions about the relationship between school size and LSP 
achievement impacts. We do not find any systematic evidence of a relationship between the 
proportion of African American or LSP students enrolled in a school12 and LSP impacts on 
student achievement.  
Other differences in LSP impacts by school demographics relied on a weak instrument or 
were not statistically significant (p > 0.10) (see Appendix Tables A1-A8 for diagnostic measures 
of all instruments). For full results by total enrollment and enrollment demographics, please see 
Appendix Tables A11, A15, A19, and A23. 
  
                                                 
12 We calculated the LSP share of school enrollments by dividing the number of LSP lottery winners enrolled in 
a given school by the total K-12 enrollment of the school as reported by the Private School Universe Survey. 
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Table 8.             
             
Variation in LATE estimates by school tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio 
    2012-13   2013-14   2014-15   2015-16 
  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Tuition, per $1,000, relative to mean n 1,418 1,417  1,265 1,264  985 984  596 587 
τ2 0.04 0.06  0.04 0.21  0.01 0.06  0.09 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.19)  (0.32) (0.26)  (11.49) (2.23) 
μ $5,394   $5,454   $5,470   $5,510  
                          
Full-Time Equivalents, per 10 FTE, 
relative to mean 
n 1,504 1,503  1,351 1,350  1,049 1,048  632 623 
τ2 0.00 0.11***  0.01 0.11*  0.13 0.29*  -0.07 0.15 
 (0.03) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.06)  (0.10) (0.15)  (0.31) (0.80) 
μ 21.0   21.1   21.3   21.5  
                          
Student/Teacher Ratio, relative to 
mean 
n 1,504 1,503  1,351 1,350  1,049 1,048  632 623 
τ2 0.01 0.00  0.05 0.06  0.06 0.00  0.02 -0.09 
 (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.11)  (0.22) (0.21) 
μ 12.95   12.80   12.86   12.96  
                          * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. "Religious" schools include all Catholic schools, Christian but non-Catholic 
schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong 
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Table 9.             
             
Variation in LATE estimates by total enrollment and enrollment demographics    
    2012-13   2013-14   2014-15   2015-16 
  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Total K-12 Enrollment, per 100 
students, relative to mean 
n 1,504 1,503  1,351 1,350  1,049 1,048  632 623 
τ2 0.01 0.10***  0.03 0.11**  0.10 0.21*  -0.03 0.07 
 (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.11)  (0.23) (1.32) 
μ 275.29   275.94   278.64   280.42  
                          
% African American, per 10pp, 
relative to mean 
n 1,504 1,503  1,351 1,350  1,049 1,048  632 623 
τ2 -0.03 0.02  -0.10** -0.05  -0.10 -0.06  0.01 -0.08 
 (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.08)  (0.16) (0.14) 
μ 44.60   44.29   43.65   42.95  
                          
% LSP, per 10 pp, relative to mean n 1,504 1,503  1,318 1,317  930 929  523 517 
τ2 0.00 0.00  -0.17 -0.15  0.02 -0.33  0.38 -0.20 
 (0.03) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.12)  (0.23) (0.32)  (4.60) (4.41) 
μ 0.25  0.21  0.17  0.13 
                          * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. "Religious" schools include all Catholic schools, Christian but non-Catholic 
schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong 
instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A1, A3, A5, and A7). For full results, see Appendix Tables A11, A15, A19, and A23. 
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Outcomes by instructional intensity 
Next, we consider measures of instructional intensity including the number of days per 
school year, the number of hours per school day, and the total number of instructional hours in a 
school year, as reported in the PSS (Table 10). The LSP impacts on math outcomes are positively 
associated with the number of hours per school day or total instructional hours per school year13 
of the preferred school. We find some evidence that LATE estimates varied with instructional 
hours, but not with the number of instructional days. Students who preferred schools with an 
additional hour per school day above the mean of 7.1 hours experienced LSP impacts over a fifth 
of a standard deviation higher in math than their peers who preferred a school at the mean (0.22, 
p < 0.05). Similarly, students who preferred schools with an additional 100 instructional hours 
per year above the mean of 1,268 hours experienced LSP impacts over a tenth of a standard 
deviation higher in math than their peers who preferred schools at the mean (0.10, p < 0.05). This 
pattern continued into the second year, when students who preferred schools with an additional 
hour per school day above the mean experienced LSP impacts 0.38 standard deviations higher in 
math and students who preferred schools with an additional 100 hours per year above the mean 
experienced LSP impacts 0.19 standard deviations higher in math, each relative to the LSP 
impacts on their peers who preferred a school at the mean. However, by the third year, all 
interaction estimates relied on weak instruments, suggesting possibly biased results. For full 
findings by instructional intensity, please reference Appendix Tables A12, A16, A20, and A24. 
  
                                                 
13 The total number of instructional hours is a simple interaction of days per year and hours per day, without 
adjusting for the number of partial days a school may have scheduled. 
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Table 10.             
             
Variation in LATE estimates by instructional intensity        
    2012-13   2013-14   2014-15   2015-16 
  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math  ELA Math 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
School Year Days, per 10 days, 
relative to mean 
n 1,504 1,503  1,351 1,350  1,049 1,048  632 623 
τ2 -0.02 0.03  0.12 0.31  0.17 0.35  0.34 0.13 
 (0.09) (0.12)  (0.71) (1.26)  (1.85) (1.76)  (22.51) (56.02) 
μ 178.8  179.1  179.0  179.1 
                          
School Day Hours, relative to mean n 1,504 1,503  1,351 1,350  1,049 1,048  632 623 
τ2 0.03 0.22**  0.25 0.38*  0.32 0.32  0.69 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.21)  (0.35) (0.32)  (0.74) (0.62) 
μ 7.09  7.08  7.09  7.12 
                          
Total Instructional Hours, per 100 
hours, relative to mean 
n 1,504 1,503  1,351 1,350  1,049 1,048  632 623 
τ2 0.01 0.10**  0.11 0.19*  0.13 0.16  0.24 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.10)  (0.16) (0.14)  (0.48) (0.26) 
μ 1,268.0   1,267.8   1,270.4   1,275.5  
                          * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. "Religious" schools include all Catholic schools, Christian but non-Catholic 
schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong 
instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A1, A3, A5, and A7). For full results, see Appendix Tables A12, A16, A20, and A24. 
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Results by tercile 
Finally, we conduct a tiered analysis by dividing schools enrolling LSP students into 
three equally sized terciles according to the distribution of each school characteristic.14 Using our 
simple model, we restrict our analytic sample to only students who listed as their first preference 
a school in each respective tercile, comparing the outcomes of these students to the control group 
of students who also listed these schools as their first preference, but did not win an LSP 
scholarship. However, as in the previous section, we cannot claim that differences in LSP 
impacts necessarily were caused by the school characteristics captured by the terciles, as students 
were not randomly assigned within school characteristic terciles, but were randomized by first-
choice school. 
Evaluations of the LSP after one year report large negative effects in both ELA and math 
(Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2018; Mills, 2015) that dissipate for ELA after two years (Mills & Wolf, 
2017a), become statistically insignificant for both subject domains after three years (Mills & 
Wolf, 2017b), and return to negative and statistically significant for both subject domains after 
four years (Mills & Wolf, 2019). 
Variation in ELA and math LATE estimates by terciles of school tuition and staffing is 
summarized in Tables 11 and 12, respectively. Students who preferred schools that charged a 
higher tuition do not experience a negative effect of the LSP on math outcomes. In the first year 
of statewide expansion of the LSP, students who preferred a school in the bottom two terciles in 
terms of tuition charged experience math impacts of -0.47 and -0.67 standard deviations, 
respectively (p < 0.01). This negative math effect persists for students preferring a school in the 
bottom tercile of tuition in the second year (-0.69 standard deviations, p < 0.05). Similarly,
                                                 
14 For the cutoff values for the bottom, middle, and upper terciles, refer to Tables 3-6. 
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Table 11.              
              
Variation in ELA LATE estimates by terciles of school tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio 
      2012-13 
 2013-14  2014-15  2015-16 
   n β 
 n β  n β  n β 
      (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Tuition Top 33%  259 -0.01  226 0.54  202 -0.01  130 -0.55 
    (0.36)   (0.71)   (6.07)   (3.38) 
 Middle 33%  564 -0.15  457 0.03  311 0.54  179 1.13 
    (0.14)   (0.22)   (0.40)   (4.66) 
 Bottom 33%  599 -0.16  584 -0.30  475 -0.09  290 -0.32 
        (0.14)     (0.22)     (0.39)     (0.86) 
Full-Time Equivalents Top 33%  510 -0.03  445 0.16  309 0.41  168 0.04 
    (0.13)   (0.24)   (0.45)   (1.47) 
 Middle 33%  640 -0.46***  564 -0.54**  441 -0.34  277 -0.78 
    (0.18)   (0.22)   (0.53)   (11.16) 
 Bottom 33%  375 0.13  361 0.13  319 0.23  207 0.46 
        (0.25)     (0.43)     (0.74)     (1.49) 
Student/Teacher Ratio Top 33%  628 0.00  580 0.29  488 0.44  297 0.01 
    (0.13)   (0.28)   (0.45)   (0.82) 
 Middle 33%  532 -0.40**  488 -0.61**  360 -0.66  216 -0.26 
    (0.20)   (0.26)   (0.90)   (14.25) 
 Bottom 33%  365 -0.18  302 -0.21  221 0.26  139 -0.33 
    (0.15)   (0.29)   (0.44)   (1.71) 
                            * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. “β” represents the Local Average Treatment Effect, the estimated 
achievement effect for voucher usage, for this specified sample. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule 
of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A2, A4, A6, and A8). 
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Table 12.              
              
Variation in math LATE estimates by terciles of school tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio 
      2012-13 
 2013-14  2014-15  2015-16 
   n β 
 n β  n β  n β 
      (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Tuition Top 33%  259 -0.25  226 1.05  202 -0.59  130 -1.04 
    (0.34)   (0.81)   (5.03)   (2.37) 
 Middle 33%  563 -0.47***  457 0.00  311 0.59  175 0.10 
    (0.14)   (0.17)   (0.39)   (4.07) 
 Bottom 33%  599 -0.67***  583 -0.69**  474 -0.38  285 -0.90 
        (0.19)     (0.30)     (0.44)     (0.89) 
Full-Time Equivalents Top 33%  509 -0.07  445 0.18  309 0.61  165 -0.82 
    (0.11)   (0.19)   (0.39)   (1.40) 
 Middle 33%  641 -0.98***  563 -0.92***  441 -0.75  273 -1.91 
    (0.21)   (0.31)   (0.46)   (25.77) 
 Bottom 33%  374 -0.41*  361 0.15  318 -0.02  205 0.19 
        (0.24)     (0.43)     (0.80)     (1.15) 
Student/Teacher Ratio Top 33%  627 -0.42***  581 0.33  488 0.23  294 -0.66 
    (0.13)   (0.21)   (0.37)   (0.53) 
 Middle 33%  533 -0.76  487 -1.12***  360 -0.93  211 -3.29 
    (0.24)   (0.33)   (0.68)   (115.91) 
 Bottom 33%  364 -0.42**  301 -0.14  220 0.31  138 0.09 
    (0.20)   (0.30)   (0.63)   (1.24) 
                            * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. “β” represents the Local Average Treatment Effect, the estimated achievement 
effect for voucher usage, for this specified sample. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong 
instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A2, A4, A6, and A8). 
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students who preferred a school in the bottom two terciles of the number of full-time teachers or 
equivalents employed by a school experience negative math impacts (-0.98 standard deviations, 
higher tuition do not experience a negative effect of the LSP on math outcomes. In the first year 
of statewide expansion of the LSP, students who preferred a school in the bottom two terciles in 
terms of tuition charged experience math impacts of -0.47 and -0.67 standard deviations, 
respectively (p < 0.01). This negative math effect persists for students preferring a school in the 
bottom tercile of tuition in the second year (-0.69 standard deviations, p < 0.05). Similarly, 
students who preferred a school in the bottom two terciles of the number of full-time teachers or 
equivalents employed by a school experience negative math impacts (-0.98 standard deviations, 
p < 0.01 and -0.41, p < 0.10, respectively). In contrast, students who preferred schools in the top 
tercile of tuition or full-time equivalents employed by the school do not experience a negative 
effect on math outcomes. The pattern is less clear in terms of a school’s student/teacher ratio, 
which is associated with a negative math outcome in the top and bottom terciles in the first year, 
but only the middle tercile in the second year. There is no clear pattern for ELA outcomes across 
any of these characteristics. 
Regarding total enrollment and enrollment demographic characteristics (Tables 13-14), 
students who preferred a school in the bottom tercile of total enrollment experience a negative 
LSP impact of almost three-quarters of a standard deviation in math achievement in the first year 
(-0.74, p < 0.01). Students who preferred a school in the middle tercile of total enrollment 
experience a negative LSP math impact of over half a standard deviation in the second year (-
0.51, p < 0.10). Students who preferred a school in the top tercile of total enrollment do not 
experience a statistically significant effect on math outcomes in the first, second, and fourth 
years, and are positively impacted in the third year (0.68 standard deviations, p < 0.10). 
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Table 13.              
              
Variation in ELA LATE estimates by terciles of total school enrollment and enrollment demographics   
      2012-13 
 2013-14  2014-15  2015-16 
   n β 
 n β  n β  n β 
      (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Total K-12 Enrollment Top 33%  503 -0.02  439 0.19  304 0.44  165 0.04 
    (0.12)   (0.27)   (0.47)   (1.44) 
 Middle 33%  717 -0.28  652 -0.29  519 0.12  274 -0.47 
    (0.17)   (0.23)   (0.47)   (8.85) 
 Bottom 33%  305 -0.17  279 -0.32  246 -0.67  213 -0.06 
        (0.16)     (0.42)     (0.70)     (0.72) 
% African American Top 33%  867 -0.18  813 -0.21  671 -0.30  403 0.08 
    (0.12)   (0.24)   (0.50)   (7.42) 
 Middle 33%  608 -0.15  508 -0.05  363 0.48  226 -0.07 
    (0.16)   (0.22)   (0.35)   (2.70) 
 Bottom 33%  50 -0.14  49 0.59  35 0.34  23 -1.54 
        (0.52)     (0.70)     (0.73)     (1.80) 
% LSP Top 33%  1,138 -0.18  1,012 -0.18  714 0.21  412 0.48 
    (0.11)   (0.19)   (0.30)   (0.95) 
 Middle 33%  354 -0.19  302 0.23  221 -0.03  120 -0.69 
    (0.18)   (0.31)   (0.44)   (1.40) 
 Bottom 33%  33 0.32  23 0.04  14 0.14  10 -2.52 
    (0.62)   (0.60)   (1.38)   (2.01) 
                            * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. “β” represents the Local Average Treatment Effect, the estimated 
achievement effect for voucher usage, for this specified sample. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of 
thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A2, A4, A6, and A8). 
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Table 14.              
              
Variation in math LATE estimates by terciles of total school enrollment and enrollment demographics   
      2012-13 
 2013-14  2014-15  2015-16 
   n β 
 n β  n β  n β 
      (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Total K-12 Enrollment Top 33%  502 -0.04  439 0.22  304 0.68*  162 -0.62 
    (0.12)   (0.20)   (0.38)   (1.05) 
 Middle 33%  717 -0.79  652 -0.51*  519 -0.35  272 -2.34 
    (0.19)   (0.30)   (0.41)   (9.79) 
 Bottom 33%  305 -0.74***  278 -0.60  245 -0.86  209 -0.24 
        (0.24)     (0.47)     (0.93)     (0.60) 
% African American Top 33%  866 -0.52***  813 -0.22  670 -0.18  396 -1.04 
    (0.14)   (0.23)   (0.47)   (2.29) 
 Middle 33%  608 -0.52***  507 -0.38  363 0.08  225 -0.58 
    (0.19)   (0.30)   (0.45)   (18.48) 
 Bottom 33%  50 -0.56  49 0.55  35 -0.46  22 -1.65 
        (0.44)     (0.66)     (0.68)     (2.07) 
% LSP Top 33%  1,138 -0.54***  1,012 -0.31  714 -0.06  406 -0.76 
    (0.13)   (0.20)   (0.28)   (0.67) 
 Middle 33%  353 -0.51**  301 0.05  220 0.13  120 -0.69 
    (0.26)   (0.31)   (0.62)   (2.87) 
 Bottom 33%  33 -0.10  23 0.52  14 -0.57  10 -1.00 
    (0.30)   (0.83)   (0.58)   (0.88) 
                            * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. “β” represents the Local Average Treatment Effect, the estimated 
achievement effect for voucher usage, for this specified sample. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of 
thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A2, A4, A6, and A8). 
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In terms of demographic composition, students who preferred schools with the greatest 
proportion of African American or LSP students experience negative effects of the program on  
math outcomes after the first year. Students who preferred a school in the top two terciles by 
proportion of African American or LSP students experience a negative math impact of more than 
half a standard deviation. In contrast, students who preferred a school in the bottom tercile of 
these characteristics do not experience an effect. All effect estimates for math by enrollment 
demographics become statistically insignificant in the second year and continue to be so after 
four years (Table 14). No statistically significant associations of enrollment demographics are 
detected on ELA outcomes (Table 13). 
Finally, no clear pattern emerges in terms of a school’s instructional intensity and the 
achievement impacts of the LSP (Tables 15-16). In the first year, students who preferred a school 
in the top tercile of the length of school year experience a negative effect on ELA outcomes of -
0.66 standard deviations (p < 0.10). Students who preferred a school in the middle tercile of total 
instructional hours experience a negative effect on ELA outcomes of almost half a standard 
deviation (-0.49, p < 0.05) and students who preferred a school in the middle tercile of days per 
school year experience a negative math effect of half a standard deviation (p < 0.01). Despite 
failing to detect any statistically significant associations on ELA outcomes in terms of hours per 
school day, students who preferred a school in the bottom tercile of the length of school day 
experience a negative effect on ELA outcomes of 0.57 standard deviations (p < 0.10). Students in 
all terciles of instructional intensity experience negative effects on math outcomes after the first 
year, but all other effect estimates became statistically insignificant by the second year.  
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Table 15.              
              
Variation in ELA LATE estimates by terciles of instructional intensity       
      2012-13 
 2013-14  2014-15  2015-16 
   n β 
 n β  n β  n β 
      (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
School Year Days Top 33%  227 -0.66*  172 -0.55  98 -0.26  62 -0.62 
    (0.35)   (0.39)   (0.78)   (5.13) 
 Middle 33%  1,167 -0.14  1,086 -0.13  883 0.04  548 -0.12 
    (0.11)   (0.17)   (0.33)   (2.31) 
 Bottom 33%  131 0.22  112 0.57  88 0.51  42 0.74 
        (0.28)     (0.52)     (0.90)     (5.21) 
School Day Hours Top 33%  752 -0.10  670 0.03  510 0.21  267 0.80 
    (0.14)   (0.24)   (0.38)   (0.96) 
 Middle 33%  460 -0.22  395 -0.01  300 0.06  202 -1.00 
    (0.17)   (0.29)   (0.57)   (3.05) 
 Bottom 33%  313 -0.25  305 -0.57*  259 -0.41  183 -1.70 
        (0.24)     (0.34)     (2.11)     (117.32) 
Total Instructional 
Hours 
Top 33%  704 -0.05  631 0.09  474 0.37  249 1.04 
   (0.14)   (0.24)   (0.33)   (0.97) 
 Middle 33%  332 -0.49**  291 -0.27  208 -0.70  146 -1.70 
    (0.21)   (0.31)   (0.90)   (1.12) 
 Bottom 33%  489 -0.13  448 -0.35  387 0.00  257 -1.14 
    (0.18)   (0.31)   (0.83)   (78.38) 
                            * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. “β” represents the Local Average Treatment Effect, the estimated 
achievement effect for voucher usage, for this specified sample. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of 
thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A2, A4, A6, and A8). 
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Table 16.              
              
Variation in math LATE estimates by terciles of instructional intensity       
      2012-13 
 2013-14  2014-15  2015-16 
   n β 
 n β  n β  n β 
      (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
School Year Days Top 33%  227 -0.73  172 -0.29  98 0.80  62 -0.21 
    (0.50)   (0.55)   (1.15)   (5.52) 
 Middle 33%  1,165 -0.50***  1,085 -0.31  882 -0.20  541 -1.20 
    (0.11)   (0.20)   (0.33)   (1.30) 
 Bottom 33%  132 -0.48  112 0.36  88 -0.37  40 0.29 
        (0.29)     (0.60)     (0.76)     (3.91) 
School Day Hours Top 33%  752 -0.38***  669 -0.12  510 0.09  260 -1.16 
    (0.13)   (0.26)   (0.31)   (0.86) 
 Middle 33%  460 -0.73***  395 -0.15  300 -0.35  202 -0.24 
    (0.24)   (0.30)   (0.69)   (15.61) 
 Bottom 33%  312 -0.58***  305 -0.65  258 -0.26  181 -1.29 
        (0.22)     (0.41)     (6.45)     (210.11) 
Total Instructional 
Hours 
Top 33%  703 -0.33**  630 -0.05  474 0.22  244 -0.98 
   (0.14)   (0.26)   (0.28)   (0.67) 
 Middle 33%  332 -0.92***  291 -0.37  208 -0.57  146 -0.79 
    (0.34)   (0.35)   (1.06)   (1.56) 
 Bottom 33%  489 -0.54***  448 -0.50  386 -0.38  253 -0.79 
    (0.17)   (0.35)   (0.76)   (73.62) 
  
 
                          * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. “β” represents the Local Average Treatment Effect, the estimated 
achievement effect for voucher usage, for this specified sample. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of 
thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Tables A2, A4, A6, and A8). 
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Summary of differential effects 
 The clearest results of our exploration of heterogeneous effects emerged from the tercile 
analysis of school tuition, total K-12 enrollment, and school day hours. Many of the negative and 
statistically significant math test score effects are concentrated in the bottom tercile schools 
regarding those three factors (Figure 1). LSP students whose first-choice school was in the top 
tercile of total K-12 enrollment actually experienced a positive, statistically significant math 
impact in 2014-15. LSP students whose first-choice schools were in the upper third of the 
distribution on school tuition experienced a large positive math impact in 2013-14 but it was not 
statistically significant.    
 
Figure 1. Variation in LSP math impacts across terciles of school tuition charged, total school 
enrollment, and school day hours, 2012-13 through 2014-15.  
Notes. Figure presents point estimates from regression models for 2012-13 through 2014-15 for standardized math 
impacts of ever using an LSP voucher placement. Estimates in 2014-15 for tuition and school day hours, as well as 
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The analysis sample in the preceding section is restricted to students with baseline 
achievement to allow us to control for confounding influences of baseline achievement in our 
models. As a robustness check, we replicate our analysis without restricting our sample to those 
with baseline test scores. We find our results to be highly robust across both specifications, with 
only a few exceptions. 
One advantage of using an unrestricted sample is that the increased sample size should 
increase statistical power and the relevance of our instruments, as captured by larger first stage 
F-statistics. Most of the effect estimates that relied on weak instruments in our baseline analysis 
remained statistically insignificant even with strong instruments in our unrestricted analysis, with 
only two exceptions. In our third year of analysis, the effect estimation for the association 
between FTEs and both ELA and math outcomes relied on a strong instrument. The association 
is not statistically significant for ELA, but preferring a school with an additional 10 FTEs above 
the mean is associated with experiencing an LSP impact that is 0.20 standard deviations higher in 
math in the third year (p < 0.10).    
In our main analysis, if a statistically significant effect or association was detected in our 
baseline achievement sample, an effect estimate was consistently calculated in the same direction 
in the unrestricted sample. Overall, eight statistically significant interactions were detected in our 
baseline sample and six statistically significant interactions were detected in our unrestricted 
sample, with six statistically significant interactions overlapping between the two analyses. Five 
statistically significant interactions were detected in the original analysis on the baseline test 
score sample that were not detected in the analysis on the unrestricted sample. Those findings 
were for the associations of LSP share on ELA in 2013-14, hours per school day on math in 
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2012-13 and 2013-14, and total instructional hours on math in 2012-13 and 2013-14. Two 
statistically significant interactions were detected in the analysis on the unrestricted sample that 
were not detected in the analysis of the baseline achievement sample. Those findings were for 
the associations of student/teacher ratio on math in 2013-14 and proportion of students who 
identify as African American on ELA in 2014-15. The average difference between 
corresponding effect estimates across the two samples was relatively small, at 0.12 standard 
deviations, with a standard deviation in the differences in estimates of 0.39. 
In our tiered analysis, 30 statistically significant effects were detected in the original 
analysis on the baseline test score sample and 84 statistically significant effects were detected in 
the analysis on the unrestricted sample. These estimates consistently pointed in the same 
direction. For the analysis on the unrestricted sample, in the second year, students who preferred 
a school in the middle tercile of LSP share experience a decline of 0.40 standard deviations on 
math outcomes relative to their non-LSP peers (p < 0.10). For the same unrestricted sample, in 
the third year of analysis, preferring a school in the middle tercile of proportion of students who 
identify as African American (-0.68 standard deviations, p < 0.01) or in the middle tercile of LSP 
share (-0.56, p < 0.10) leads to negative LSP math impacts. Also for the unrestricted sample, in 
the fourth year of analysis, LSP students who preferred a school in the middle tercile of tuition 
experience math outcomes that are 0.57 standard deviations lower relative to their control group 
(p < 0.05). In the analysis on the baseline sample, in contrast, all four of these corresponding 
LSP effect estimates were positive, though statistically insignificant. The average difference 
between corresponding effect estimates across the two samples for the tiered analysis is 0.02 
standard deviations and the standard deviation of the differences is 0.67. 
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Overall, the pattern of findings is robust across our two samples. We generally do not 
find consistent evidence that effects varied across school characteristics, with the possible 
exceptions of school size, tuition, and length of school day. These findings are summarized in 
Tables 17-20. We caution the reader that these tables are a selected list of statistically significant 
findings that are not necessarily representative of our overall effect estimates, most of which 
were not statistically significant at conventional levels. For the sake of brevity, full results are 
not included in this report but will be made available online and by request. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines how achievement impacts of the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
(LSP), a statewide school voucher program, vary across different types of participating private 
schools. This examination is especially important in the case of the LSP, since early evaluations 
of the program revealed large negative effects of the program on student achievement after only 
one year of participation (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2018; Mills, 2015). This report helps provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the LSP’s impacts on participating students by determining the 
extent to which these effects vary across private schools with different characteristics. 
Specifically, we examine how treatment effects vary across school characteristics such as 
religious identity, urban setting, tuition, enrollment, staffing, and student demographics. Broadly 
speaking, we find limited evidence of variation in treatment effects related to school 
characteristics. There are, however, notable exceptions. Our study shows that outcomes are 
positively associated with size, tuition, and length of school day. Moreover, it is possible that the 
generally insignificant differences regarding the associations of other school features with the 
LSP impacts partially reflect low statistical power, as several differences in impact estimates 
statistically insignificant are nonetheless large in magnitude. This condition could be due to 
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limited variation in certain characteristics (see Tables 3-6), small sample size, particularly for the 
tiered analysis (see Tables 11-16), or the limited predictive power and relevance of instruments, 
especially by the third and fourth years (see Appendix Tables A1-A8). 
 
Table 17.        
Statistically significant findings in both samples, in baseline achievement sample, and in unrestricted sample, 2012-13 






  (1) (2) (3) 
FTE positively associated with math X   
Total K-12 enrollment positively associated with math X   
Negative ELA outcomes for middle FTE tercile X   
Negative ELA outcomes for middle student/teacher ratio tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle tuition tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for bottom tuition tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle FTE tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for bottom FTE tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for top student/teacher ratio tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for bottom student/teacher ratio tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for bottom total K-12 enrollment tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for top % African American tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle % African American tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for top % LSP tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle % LSP tercile X   
Negative ELA outcomes for top school year days tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle school year days tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for top school day hours tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle school day hours tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for bottom school day hours tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for top total instructional hours tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle total instructional hours tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for bottom total instructional hours tercile X   
School day hours positively associated with math  X  
Total instructional hours positively associated with math  X  
Negative ELA outcomes for middle total instructional hours tercile  X  
Negative ELA outcomes for bottom tuition tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for bottom student/teacher ratio tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle student/teacher ratio tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for bottom total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for top % African American tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for top % LSP tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle school year days tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top school year days tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for bottom school year days tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for top school day hours tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle total instructional hours tercile     X 
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Table 18.    
    
Statistically significant findings in both samples, in baseline achievement sample, and in unrestricted sample, 2013-14 






  (1) (2) (3) 
Urban schools positive relative to non-urban schools on math X   
FTE positively associated with math X   
Total K-12 enrollment positively associated with math X   
Negative math outcomes for bottom tuition tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle FTE tercile X   
Negative ELA outcomes for middle student/teacher ratio tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle student/teacher ratio tercile X   
Negative math outcomes for middle total K-12 enrollment tercile X   
Negative ELA outcomes for middle FTE tercile  X  
Negative ELA outcomes for bottom school day hours tercile  X  
Negative ELA outcomes for bottom tuition tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle FTE tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for bottom total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle % African American tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top % African American tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle % African American tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top % LSP tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle % LSP tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle school year days tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top school day hours tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle school day hours tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for bottom school day hours tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle total instructional hours tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle total instructional hours tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for bottom total instructional hours tercile     X 
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Table 19.    
    
Statistically significant findings in both samples, in baseline achievement sample, and in unrestricted sample, 2014-15 






  (1) (2) (3) 
FTE positively associated with math X   
Positive math outcomes for top total K-12 enrollment tercile  X  
Negative math outcomes for bottom tuition tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle FTE tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle FTE tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle student/teacher ratio tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle student/teacher ratio tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle % African American tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle % LSP tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle school year days tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle school day hours tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for bottom total instructional hours tercile     X 
    
 
Table 20.    
    
Statistically significant findings in both samples, in baseline achievement sample, and in unrestricted sample, 2015-16 






  (1) (2) (3) 
Negative math outcomes for middle tuition tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for bottom tuition tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle FTE tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top FTE tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle FTE tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle student/teacher ratio tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle total K-12 enrollment tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle % African American tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle % LSP tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top % LSP tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle % LSP tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle school year days tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top school day hours tercile   X 
Negative ELA outcomes for middle total instructional hours tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for top total instructional hours tercile   X 
Negative math outcomes for middle total instructional hours tercile     X 
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Our finding that LSP-participating schools with higher enrollments generated 
significantly better (or less negative) initial voucher impacts than LSP-participating schools with 
lower enrollments is consequential. That finding implies that a movement to higher-quality (or at 
least away from lower-quality) by choosing parents is producing a connection between more 
popular and more effective private schools. Given the limitations of our research design, that 
connection is a correlation and not an experimental impact, but it is consistent with market 
theory. Our finding that higher school tuitions are associated with better LSP impacts suggests 
that tuition levels may be serving as proxies for private school quality in the LSP. Finally, our 
finding that LSP schools with longer school days were correlated with better LSP achievement 
impacts suggest that private schools in the LSP that adopt the conditions of “academic press” 
(Berends, Goldring, Stein, & Cravens, 2010) tend to be better able to reproduce the average 
gains achieved by public school students on the state accountability test. As it stands, our 
analysis indicates LSP treatment effects on student achievement do not generally differentiate 
across school characteristics, with these few exceptions. 
Though our study builds upon a highly rigorous experimental design, our study suffers 
from three important limitations. First, weak instruments often limit our analysis. There is no 
scholarly consensus on calculating effective F-statistics for analyses with multiple endogenous 
regressors. That problem afflicts our study, as students sort themselves into first-preference 
lotteries, affecting both LSP enrollment and the school characteristic interactions. Therefore, we 
depend on an established, but imperfect, rule of thumb to determine which instruments do and do 
not minimize bias in our estimates. Second, limited variation in school characteristics in our 
sample of schools may limit our ability to detect or generalize any effects or associations we 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3376234 




find. For example, while we find that LSP test score impacts are positively associated with the 
number of hours in the school day, the schools in our sample do not vary widely in this regard.  
Finally, while our study does have strong causal inference within lotteries, we cannot 
make causal comparisons across lotteries. For students who experienced a first-choice lottery for 
a school with a particular characteristic (e.g. a school in the top tercile of tuition), LSP 
scholarships were awarded independently of any observed or unobserved characteristics. Thus, 
the estimates of the impact of the LSP for the subgroup of students who preferred a school in the 
top tercile of tuition support strong causal inferences. However, students may sort themselves 
into different lotteries (e.g. preferring a school in the middle or bottom tercile of tuition) for 
reasons observed or unobserved that may also be related to their outcomes. Thus, comparisons 
across subgroups of students who preferred schools with different characteristics – the main 
focus of this mediator analysis – do not support strong causal inferences and are merely 
descriptive of associations in the first four years of the LSP. 
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Table A1.     
     
First stage F-statistics for primary analysis, one-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 




























  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ELA                 
Religious  1,795  668.61  568.52  115.91  1,772  120.56  51.05  15.07 
Catholic  1,795  668.61  284.31  442.42  1,772  120.56  31.22  49.66 
Coeducational  1,795  668.61  597.60  96.86  1,772  120.56  54.44  14.08 
Urban  1,795  668.61  296.35  399.28  1,772  120.56  28.46  44.15 
Tuition  1,422  303.59  90.07    1,418  54.02  23.31   
Full-Time Equivalents  1,525  317.92  90.54    1,504  57.22  25.19   
Student/Teacher Ratio  1,525  302.49  56.53    1,504  52.62  19.01   
Total Enrollment  1,525  342.85  207.43    1,504  60.91  51.90   
% African American  1,525  303.68  163.71    1,504  51.96  31.71   
% LSP  1,525  292.11  108.40    1,504  49.49  28.05   
School Year Days  1,525  296.59  47.00    1,504  49.54  14.38   
School Day Hours  1,525  294.33  87.22    1,504  49.90  25.33   
Total Instructional Hours  1,525  297.05  71.52    1,504  50.46  19.14   
Math                 
Religious  1,795  665.07  564.17  116.36  1,772  120.13  50.97  15.88 
Catholic  1,795  665.07  284.31  436.48  1,772  120.13  32.14  48.40 
Coeducational  1,795  665.07  592.96  97.27  1,772  120.13  54.44  14.06 
Urban  1,795  665.07  295.92  395.57  1,772  120.13  28.30  44.17 
Tuition  1,421  301.31  87.86    1,417  54.06  22.73   
Full-Time Equivalents  1,524  315.90  89.62    1,503  58.39  25.25   
Student/Teacher Ratio  1,524  299.46  55.80    1,503  52.45  16.65   
Total Enrollment  1,524  341.49  204.47    1,503  61.91  52.22   
% African American  1,524  301.85  162.09    1,503  52.24  31.56   
% LSP  1,524  289.63  108.58    1,503  49.47  30.70   
School Year Days  1,524  294.14  49.37    1,503  49.41  14.07   
School Day Hours  1,524  292.36  87.03    1,503  49.91  22.48   
Total Instructional Hours  1,524  294.81  71.36    1,503  50.39  17.98   
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Table A2.          
          
First stage F-statistics for tiered analysis, one-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort  
    Bottom Tercile 
 Middle Tercile  Top Tercile 
  n F-statistic 
 n F-statistic  n F-statistic 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
ELA          
Tuition  599 236.41  564 436.49  259 53.14 
FTE  375 89.19  640 275.17  510 350.59 
Student/Teacher Ratio  365 246.93  532 150.84  628 245.04 
Total Enrollment  305 116.00  717 232.07  503 327.16 
% African American  50 35.20  608 262.31  867 280.48 
% LSP  33 18.67  354 137.14  1,138 419.90 
School Year Days  131 92.68  1,167 444.95  227 52.51 
School Day Hours  313 112.02  460 157.77  752 308.54 
Total Instructional Hours  489 205.16  332 94.81  704 283.35 
                    Math          
Tuition  599 232.54  563 435.42  259 53.14 
FTE  374 86.83  641 275.85  509 349.56 
Student/Teacher Ratio  364 237.93  533 151.28  627 244.51 
Total Enrollment  305 112.45  717 232.07  502 326.17 
% African American  50 35.20  608 262.31  866 276.52 
% LSP  33 18.67  353 132.31  1,138 420.25 
School Year Days  132 94.05  1,165 439.53  227 52.51 
School Day Hours  312 108.53  460 157.77  752 309.11 
Total Instructional Hours  489 201.39  332 94.81  703 282.81 
                     
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3376234 




Table A3.     
     
First stage F-statistics for primary analysis, two-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 




























  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ELA                 
Religious  1,572  201.47  178.68  30.90  1,551  30.79  17.33  4.56 
Catholic  1,572  201.47  119.26  84.24  1,550  30.79  14.34  9.39 
Coeducational  1,572  201.47  176.93  30.74  1,551  30.79  16.83  4.55 
Urban  1,572  201.47  97.64  116.54  1,551  30.79  11.35  12.87 
Tuition  1,267  95.25  11.13    1,265  16.81  5.16   
Full-Time Equivalents  1,370  121.81  54.95    1,351  25.91  14.05   
Student/Teacher Ratio  1,370  94.22  13.18    1,351  16.97  4.81   
Total Enrollment  1,370  109.82  74.25    1,351  22.77  22.55   
% African American  1,370  120.94  45.83    1,351  21.85  7.35   
% LSP  1,337  117.42  26.28    1,318  22.18  5.19   
School Year Days  1,370  102.66  1.53    1,351  18.61  1.34   
School Day Hours  1,370  92.28  25.74    1,351  16.70  7.44   
Total Instructional Hours  1,370  93.62  17.25    1,351  17.15  5.20   
Math                 
Religious  1,571  199.21  176.40  30.89  1,551  31.29  17.46  4.30 
Catholic  1,571  199.21  116.51  84.44  1,550  31.29  14.53  8.54 
Coeducational  1,571  199.21  174.66  30.74  1,550  31.29  16.98  3.79 
Urban  1,571  199.21  95.37  116.73  1,550  31.29  11.03  12.88 
Tuition  1,266  93.61  11.20    1,264  16.96  4.88   
Full-Time Equivalents  1,369  120.70  54.61    1,350  26.22  14.55   
Student/Teacher Ratio  1,369  93.05  12.17    1,350  17.28  3.62   
Total Enrollment  1,369  108.92  74.25    1,350  23.56  24.33   
% African American  1,369  120.24  44.82    1,350  22.12  6.96   
% LSP  1,336  116.77  25.49    1,317  22.58  5.15   
School Year Days  1,369  101.32  1.53    1,350  18.63  1.40   
School Day Hours  1,369  91.10  24.61    1,350  16.85  7.04   
Total Instructional Hours  1,369  92.20  16.65    1,350  17.13  5.64   
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Table A4.          
          
First stage F-statistics for tiered analysis, two-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort  
    Bottom Tercile 
 Middle Tercile  Top Tercile 
  n F-statistic 
 n F-statistic  n F-statistic 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
ELA          
Tuition  584 67.85  457 126.52  226 12.03 
FTE  361 23.53  564 80.40  445 111.99 
Student/Teacher Ratio  302 43.08  488 76.49  580 70.62 
Total Enrollment  279 23.12  652 74.68  439 110.16 
% African American  49 17.88  508 132.11  813 73.23 
% LSP  23 19.87  302 58.30  1,012 129.68 
School Year Days  112 17.32  1,086 134.67  172 37.16 
School Day Hours  305 33.00  395 48.86  670 103.46 
Total Instructional Hours  448 38.06  291 40.19  631 119.04 
                    Math          
Tuition  583 68.02  457 126.52  226 11.10 
FTE  361 22.47  563 80.34  445 111.99 
Student/Teacher Ratio  301 43.28  487 76.42  581 68.52 
Total Enrollment  278 23.16  652 72.35  439 110.16 
% African American  49 17.88  507 132.05  813 71.67 
% LSP  23 19.87  301 58.81  1,012 127.17 
School Year Days  112 17.32  1,085 132.45  172 37.16 
School Day Hours  305 33.15  395 48.86  669 100.63 
Total Instructional Hours  448 38.18  291 40.19  630 115.72 
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Table A5.     
     
First stage F-statistics for primary analysis, three-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 




























  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ELA                 
Religious  1,192  71.50  65.76  6.66  1,172  11.34  8.55  1.72 
Catholic  1,192  71.50  48.06  25.46  1,171  11.34  8.50  3.81 
Coeducational  1,192  71.50  62.52  9.13  1,172  11.34  8.34  1.61 
Urban  1,192  71.50  34.74  36.77  1,172  11.34  5.71  4.68 
Tuition  988  40.02  6.46    985  8.81  4.06   
Full-Time Equivalents  1,069  51.59  41.09    1,049  9.88  10.18   
Student/Teacher Ratio  1,069  33.09  7.34    1,049  8.45  3.01   
Total Enrollment  1,069  40.86  29.53    1,049  8.33  7.78   
% African American  1,069  45.52  18.02    1,049  10.13  5.49   
% LSP  949  44.18  8.52    930  10.23  3.33   
School Year Days  1,069  37.85  1.62    1,049  8.68  1.50   
School Day Hours  1,069  35.27  11.81    1,049  8.03  4.12   
Total Instructional Hours  1,069  36.38  5.57    1,049  7.99  2.91   
Math                 
Religious  1,191  71.55  65.82  6.66  1,184  10.97  8.29  1.75 
Catholic  1,191  71.55  48.06  25.49  1,171  10.97  8.48  3.65 
Coeducational  1,191  71.55  62.57  9.13  1,171  10.97  8.13  1.64 
Urban  1,191  71.55  34.73  36.82  1,171  10.97  5.49  4.99 
Tuition  987  40.00  6.48    984  8.40  4.78   
Full-Time Equivalents  1,068  51.64  41.21    1,048  9.66  10.70   
Student/Teacher Ratio  1,068  33.10  7.33    1,048  8.23  2.51   
Total Enrollment  1,068  40.87  29.55    1,048  7.98  8.76   
% African American  1,068  45.53  18.03    1,048  9.92  5.18   
% LSP  948  44.37  8.52    929  9.87  3.25   
School Year Days  1,068  37.90  1.62    1,048  8.38  1.50   
School Day Hours  1,068  35.29  11.81    1,048  7.71  4.16   
Total Instructional Hours  1,068  36.40  5.57    1,048  7.65  2.96   
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Table A6.          
          
First stage F-statistics for tiered analysis, three-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort  
    Bottom Tercile 
 Middle Tercile  Top Tercile 
  n F-statistic 
 n F-statistic  n F-statistic 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
ELA          
Tuition  475 29.48  311 41.01  202 5.50 
FTE  319 10.64  441 25.95  309 39.16 
Student/Teacher Ratio  221 17.64  360 17.32  488 30.31 
Total Enrollment  246 10.49  519 23.27  304 38.70 
% African American  35 7.47  363 41.13  671 27.18 
% LSP  14 8.57  221 26.37  714 46.35 
School Year Days  88 15.72  883 42.44  98 14.30 
School Day Hours  259 6.99  300 19.65  510 49.49 
Total Instructional Hours  387 11.69  208 13.94  474 53.01 
                    Math          
Tuition  474 29.54  311 41.01  202 5.50 
FTE  318 10.65  441 25.95  309 39.16 
Student/Teacher Ratio  220 17.68  360 17.32  488 30.31 
Total Enrollment  245 10.49  519 23.27  304 38.70 
% African American  35 7.47  363 41.13  670 27.21 
% LSP  14 8.57  220 26.54  714 46.35 
School Year Days  88 15.72  882 42.49  98 14.30 
School Day Hours  258 7.00  300 19.65  510 49.49 
Total Instructional Hours  386 11.70  208 13.94  474 53.01 
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Table A7.     
     
First stage F-statistics for primary analysis, four-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 




























  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ELA                 
Religious  735  16.16  13.73  2.62  715  5.27  3.13  1.26 
Catholic  735  16.16  7.03  15.00  715  5.27  2.11  2.84 
Coeducational  735  16.16  14.09  2.15  715  5.27  3.23  1.13 
Urban  735  16.16  9.30  7.06  715  5.27  2.19  2.20 
Tuition  599  12.94  5.39    596  4.25  2.03   
Full-Time Equivalents  652  19.02  35.24    632  4.84  9.79   
Student/Teacher Ratio  652  7.39  7.79    632  3.29  4.02   
Total Enrollment  652  12.93  13.09    632  4.55  4.88   
% African American  652  9.93  5.80    632  3.14  3.00   
% LSP  542  10.70  1.74    523  3.39  1.52   
School Year Days  652  14.76  3.30    632  5.01  1.18   
School Day Hours  652  7.34  4.28    632  3.32  3.10   
Total Instructional Hours  652  7.81  3.30    632  3.47  3.17   
Math                 
Religious  723  13.55  12.08  1.50  706  4.32  2.83  1.12 
Catholic  723  13.55  5.84  13.03  703  4.32  2.07  2.59 
Coeducational  723  13.55  12.43  1.15  703  4.32  2.88  1.03 
Urban  723  13.55  7.91  5.82  703  4.32  2.03  2.23 
Tuition  590  11.38  6.06    587  3.81  2.19   
Full-Time Equivalents  643  17.72  30.36    623  4.80  10.28   
Student/Teacher Ratio  643  6.40  6.80    623  2.89  3.82   
Total Enrollment  643  10.92  10.66    623  3.78  5.58   
% African American  643  8.58  4.61    623  2.96  2.66   
% LSP  536  9.35  1.49    517  2.90  1.64   
School Year Days  643  15.43  4.99    623  5.09  1.41   
School Day Hours  643  6.42  3.96    623  2.86  3.12   
Total Instructional Hours  643  6.75  3.23    623  2.95  3.40   
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Table A8.          
          
First stage F-statistics for tiered analysis, four-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort  
    Bottom Tercile 
 Middle Tercile  Top Tercile 
  n F-statistic 
 n F-statistic  n F-statistic 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
ELA          
Tuition  290 7.76  179 6.66  130 5.79 
FTE  207 5.70  277 2.94  168 15.73 
Student/Teacher Ratio  139 6.63  216 0.66  297 14.67 
Total Enrollment  213 8.22  274 1.55  165 15.53 
% African American  23 4.97  226 5.14  403 6.82 
% LSP  10   120 13.05  412 8.51 
School Year Days  42 1.90  548 9.73  62 3.29 
School Day Hours  183 0.86  202 9.14  267 8.14 
Total Instructional Hours  257 0.94  146 13.24  249 8.36 
                    Math          
Tuition  285 7.32  175 6.53  130 4.20 
FTE  205 5.74  273 2.59  165 13.70 
Student/Teacher Ratio  138 6.64  211 0.66  294 11.65 
Total Enrollment  209 8.38  272 1.28  162 13.71 
% African American  22 2.96  225 4.95  396 5.88 
% LSP  10   120 10.02  406 7.54 
School Year Days  40 1.99  541 8.16  62 3.29 
School Day Hours  181 0.87  202 7.71  260 7.09 
Total Instructional Hours  253 0.94  146 10.80  244 7.22 
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Table A9.                  
Variation in LATE estimates by religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting, one-year impacts for 
the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 
Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Religious n 1,516  1,495  1,515  1,494 
 τ1 -0.17*  -0.17**  -0.53***  -0.60*** 
  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Non-Religious n 279  277  280  278 
 τ1 -0.42  -0.30  -0.75**  -0.73*** 
  (0.28)  (0.21)  (0.31)  (0.27) 
Difference τ2 0.25  0.13  0.23  0.14 
    (0.29)   (0.21)   (0.32)   (0.28) 
Catholic n 946  927  946  927 
 τ1 -0.21  -0.19*  -0.61***  -0.74*** 
  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.14) 
Non-Catholic n 849  845  849  845 
 τ1 -0.21*  -0.19**  -0.51***  -0.51*** 
  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Difference τ2 0.00  0.01  -0.10  -0.23 
    (0.18)   (0.13)   (0.21)   (0.18) 
Coeducational n 1,499  1,478  1,498  1,477 
 τ1 -0.16*  -0.16*  -0.52***  -0.60*** 
  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Single-Gender n 296  294  297  295 
 τ1 -0.52*  -0.37*  -0.78**  -0.74*** 
  (0.29)  (0.21)  (0.31)  (0.27) 
Difference τ2 0.36  0.21  0.25  0.15 
    (0.30)   (0.22)   (0.32)   (0.28) 
Urban n 895  875  894  874 
 τ1 -0.14  -.19*  -0.38***  -0.51*** 
  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Suburban, Town, or Rural n 900  897  901  898 
 τ1 -0.28**  -0.19*  -0.73***  -0.72*** 
  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.13) 
Difference τ2 0.14  0.00  0.35*  0.21 
  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.18) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. "Religious" schools include all Catholic schools, Christian 
but non-Catholic schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's 
(1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A1).  
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Table A10.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by school tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio, one-
year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Tuition (demeaned, average = $5,394) 
n  1,422  1,418  1,421  1,417 
Estimated effect at average  -0.12  0.13*  -0.48***  -0.59*** 
  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Interaction (per $1,000)  0.04  0.03  0.12  0.06 
  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
Full-Time Equivalents (demeaned, average = 21.0) 
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.17*  -0.17**  -0.57***  -0.65*** 
  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Interaction (per 10 FTE)  0.01  0.00  0.13***  0.11*** 
  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Student/Teacher Ratio (demeaned, average = 13.0)       
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.21**  -0.18**  -0.57***  -0.61*** 
  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Interaction  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy 
Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A1). 
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Table A11.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by total enrollment and enrollment demographics, one-year impacts for the 2012-13 
cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Total Enrollment (demeaned, average = 275) 
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.18*  -0.17**  -0.61***  -0.68*** 
  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Interaction (per 100 students) 0.03  0.01  0.12  0.10 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
% African American (demeaned, average = 44.6%) 
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.08  -0.09  -0.49***  -0.65*** 
  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  0.02 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
% LSP (demeaned, average = 25.2%) 
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.21*  -0.18*  -0.49***  -0.60*** 
  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.11) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  0.02  0.00  -0.02  0.00 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy 
Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A1). 
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Table A12.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by instructional intensity, one-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Days per school year (demeaned, average = 178.8)       
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.17*  -0.17**  -0.52***  -0.60*** 
  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Interaction (per 10 days)  0.00  -0.02  0.11  0.03 
  (0.17)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Hours per school day (demeaned, average = 7.1)       
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.17*  -0.17**  -0.54***  -0.62*** 
  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Interaction  0.03  0.03  0.20  0.22 
  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.10) 
Total instructional hours (demeaned, average = 1,268.0)     
n  1,525  1,504  1,524  1,503 
Estimated effect at average  -0.17*  -0.17*  -0.54***  -0.62*** 
  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Interaction (per 100 hours)  0.01  0.01  0.10*  0.10** 
  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy 
Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A1). 
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Table A13.                  
Variation in LATE estimates by religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting, two-year impacts for the 
2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Religious n 1,360  1,341  1,359  1,340 
 τ1 -0.12  -0.13  -0.25  -0.33** 
  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.15) 
Non-Religious n 212  210  212  210 
 τ1 -0.16  -0.06  -0.40  -0.47 
  (0.52)  (0.43)  (0.63)  (0.46) 
Difference τ2 0.04  -0.06  0.15  0.15 
  (0.54)  (0.45)  (0.64)  (0.48) 
Catholic n 866  848  866  848 
 τ1 -0.19  -0.17  -0.40  -0.49*** 
  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.17) 
Non-Catholic n 706  703  705  702 
 τ1 -0.04  -0.06  -0.11  -0.15 
  (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
Difference τ2 -0.15  -0.11  -0.29  -0.34 
  (0.30)  (0.23)  (0.33)  (0.28) 
Coeducational n 1,344  1,325  1,343  1,324 
 τ1 -0.09  -0.11  -0.21  -0.30** 
  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.15) 
Single-Gender n 228  226  228  226 
 τ1 -0.36  -0.18  -0.64  -0.65 
  (0.57)  (0.42)  (0.75)  (0.51) 
Difference τ2 0.27  0.07  0.43  0.36 
  (0.60)  (0.44)  (0.75)  (0.52) 
Urban n 815  797  816  798 
 τ1 -0.02  -0.13  0.15  -0.05 
  (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
Suburban, Town, or Rural n 757  754  755  752 
 τ1 -0.24  -0.11  -0.74***  -0.66*** 
  (0.23)  (0.18)  (0.28)  (0.21) 
Difference τ2 0.22  -0.02  0.88***  0.61** 
  (0.32)  (0.23)  (0.32)  (0.26) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. "Religious" schools include all Catholic schools, 
Christian but non-Catholic schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger 
and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A3).  
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Table A14.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by school tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio, two-
year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Tuition (demeaned, average = $5,454) 
n  1,267  1,265  1,266  1,264 
Estimated effect at average  -0.02  -0.07  -0.08  -0.19 
  (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.21)  (0.17) 
Interaction (per $1,000)  0.07  0.04  0.26  0.21 
  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.19) 
Full-Time Equivalents (demeaned, average = 21.1) 
n  1,370  1,351  1,369  1,350 
Estimated effect at average  -0.12  -0.14  -0.30  -0.37** 
  (0.18)  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.15) 
Interaction (per 10 FTE)  0.02  0.01  0.13*  0.11* 
  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Student/Teacher Ratio (demeaned, average = 12.8) 
n  1,370  1,351  1,369  1,350 
Estimated effect at average  -0.25  -0.19  -0.41*  -0.40** 
  (0.17)  (0.13)  (0.21)  (0.17) 
Interaction  0.10  0.05  0.13*  0.06 
  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A3). 
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Table A15.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by total enrollment and enrollment demographics, two-year impacts for the 2012-
13 cohort 
    ELA 
 
Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Total Enrollment (demeaned, average = 276) 
n  1,370  1,351  1,369  1,350 
Estimated effect at average  -0.16  -0.16  -0.36*  -0.41*** 
  (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.20)  (0.15) 
Interaction (per 100 students) 0.06  0.03  0.13**  0.11** 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
% African American (demeaned, average = 44.3%) 
n  1,370  1,351  1,369  1,350 
Estimated effect at average  0.18  0.13  -0.06  -0.19 
  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.18) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  -0.11**  -0.10**  -0.07  -0.05 
  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
% LSP (demeaned, average = 21.2%) 
n  1,337  1,318  1,336  1,317 
Estimated effect at average  0.09  0.11  -0.01  -0.09 
  (0.20)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.18) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  -0.12  -0.17*  -0.15  -0.15 
  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A3). 
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Table A16.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by instructional intensity, two-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Days per school year (demeaned, average = 179.1) 
n  1,370  1,351  1,369  1,350 
Estimated effect at average  -0.11  -0.13  -0.26  -0.33** 
  (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.15) 
Interaction (per 10 days)  0.13  0.12  0.38  0.31 
  (1.22)  (0.71)  (1.62)  (1.26) 
Hours per school day (demeaned, average = 7.1) 
n  1,370  1,351  1,369  1,350 
Estimated effect at average  -0.13  -0.15  -0.27  -0.35** 
  (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.15) 
Interaction  0.27  0.25  0.39  0.38* 
  (0.26)  (0.17)  (0.29)  (0.21) 
Total instructional hours (demeaned, average = 1,267.8) 
n  1,370  1,351  1,369  1,350 
Estimated effect at average  -0.14  -0.16  -0.29  -0.36** 
  (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.15) 
Interaction (per 100 hours)  0.12  0.11  0.20  0.19* 
  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.10) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A3). 
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Table A17.                  
Variation in LATE estimates by religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting, three-year impacts 
for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Religious n 1,062  1,042  1,061  1,041 
 τ1 0.07  0.06  -0.08  -0.17 
  (0.25)  (0.20)  (0.26)  (0.26) 
Non-Religious n 130  130  130  130 
 τ1 -0.46  -0.36  -0.41  -0.49 
  (1.25)  (1.45)  (2.48)  (2.10) 
Difference τ2 0.53  0.43  0.33  0.32 
  (1.27)  (1.47)  (2.51)  (2.14) 
Catholic n 691  673  691  673 
 τ1 0.09  -0.04  -0.39  -0.62*** 
  (0.29)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.22) 
Non-Catholic n 501  499  500  498 
 τ1 -0.10  0.09  0.26  0.42 
  (0.48)  (0.39)  (0.50)  (0.53) 
Difference τ2 0.18  -0.13  -0.65  -1.04* 
  (0.57)  (0.48)  (0.57)  (0.61) 
Coeducational n 1,047  1,027  1,046  1,026 
 τ1 0.11  0.08  -0.06  -0.17 
  (0.26)  (0.21)  (0.27)  (0.26) 
Single-Gender n 145  145  145  145 
 τ1 -0.61  -0.45  -0.50  -0.44 
  (0.90)  (0.93)  (1.02)  (1.15) 
Difference τ2 0.72  0.54  0.44  0.27 
  (0.94)  (0.94)  (1.05)  (1.19) 
Urban n 628  609  628  609 
 τ1 0.01  -0.04  -0.08  -0.33 
  (0.41)  (0.34)  (0.41)  (0.47) 
Suburban, Town, or Rural n 564  563  563  562 
 τ1 0.02  0.07  -0.16  -0.08 
  (0.33)  (0.26)  (0.36)  (0.35) 
Difference τ2 -0.01  -0.11  0.08  -0.25 
  (0.54)  (0.43)  (0.55)  (0.62) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. "Religious" schools include all Catholic schools, Christian 
but non-Catholic schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger and Stock's 
(1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A5).  
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Table A18.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by school tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio, three-
year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Tuition (demeaned, average = $5,470) 
n  988  985  987  984 
Estimated effect at average  0.18  0.14  0.00  -0.12 
  (0.38)  (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.31) 
Interaction (per $1,000)  0.00  0.01  0.07  0.06 
  (0.49)  (0.32)  (0.41)  (0.26) 
Full-Time Equivalents (demeaned, average = 21.3) 
n  1,069  1,049  1,068  1,048 
Estimated effect at average  0.03  0.02  -0.19  -0.29 
  (0.27)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.24) 
Interaction (per 10 FTE)  0.11  0.13  0.27*  0.29* 
  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Student/Teacher Ratio (demeaned, average = 12.9) 
n  1,069  1,049  1,068  1,048 
Estimated effect at average  -0.09  0.01  -0.19  -0.19 
  (0.28)  (0.22)  (0.32)  (0.29) 
Interaction  0.16  0.06  0.10  0.00 
  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A5). 
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Table A19.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by total enrollment and enrollment demographics, three-year impacts for the 
2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Total Enrollment (demeaned, average = 279) 
n  1,069  1,049  1,068  1,048 
Estimated effect at average  -0.02  0.00  -0.26  -0.33 
  (0.28)  (0.22)  (0.27)  (0.25) 
Interaction (per 100 students) 0.12  0.10  0.22*  0.21** 
  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
% African American (demeaned, average = 43.7%) 
n  1,069  1,049  1,068  1,048 
Estimated effect at average  0.45*  0.32  0.11  -0.05 
  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.28)  (0.25) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  -0.15*  -0.10  -0.08  -0.06 
  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
% LSP (demeaned, average = 16.9%) 
n  949  930  948  929 
Estimated effect at average  -0.02  0.10  0.12  0.18 
  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.42)  (0.36) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  0.17  0.02  -0.16  -0.33 
  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.39)  (0.32) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A5). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3376234 





Table A20.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by instructional intensity, three-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Days per school year (demeaned, average = 179.0)       
n  1,069  1,049  1,068  1,048 
Estimated effect at average  0.05  0.05  -0.13  -0.22 
  (0.30)  (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.26) 
Interaction (per 10 days)  0.18  0.17  0.39  0.35 
  (2.68)  (1.85)  (2.44)  (1.76) 
Hours per school day (demeaned, average = 7.1)       
n  1,069  1,049  1,068  1,048 
Estimated effect at average  0.03  0.03  -0.12  -0.23 
  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.29)  (0.26) 
Interaction  0.28  0.32  0.24  0.32 
  (0.38)  (0.35)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
Total instructional hours (demeaned, average = 1,275.5)     
n  1,069  1,049  1,068  1,048 
Estimated effect at average  0.03  0.03  -0.14  -0.24 
  (0.28)  (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.25) 
Interaction (per 100 hours)  0.12  0.13  0.14  0.16 
  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A5). 
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Table A21.                  
Variation in LATE estimates by religious status, coeducational status, and urban setting, four-year impacts for the 
2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Religious n 648  628  639  619 
 τ1 -0.14  -0.19  -0.93  -0.94 
  (0.71)  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.84) 
Non-Religious n 87  87  84  84 
 τ1 -1.95  -1.29  -0.65  -0.28 
  (59.16)  (21.51)  (9.74)  (50.01) 
Difference τ2 1.80  1.10  -0.27  -0.66 
  (59.12)  (21.55)  (9.76)  (50.51) 
Catholic n 436  418  433  415 
 τ1 -0.16  -0.16  -1.06  -1.17 
  (0.82)  (0.60)  (2.08)  (0.98) 
Non-Catholic n 299  297  290  288 
 τ1 -0.66  -0.60  -0.66  -0.39 
  (1.29)  (1.06)  (0.91)  (0.98) 
Difference τ2 0.50  0.43  -0.39  -0.78 
  (1.48)  (1.23)  (2.31)  (1.47) 
Coeducational n 652  632  643  623 
 τ1 -0.14  -0.16  -0.89  -0.89 
  (0.69)  (0.61)  (0.56)  (1.38) 
Single-Gender n 83  83  80  80 
 τ1 -2.17  -1.62  -0.99  -0.68 
  (55.47)  (22.91)  (9.84)  (60.39) 
Difference τ2 2.04  1.47  0.10  -0.21 
  (55.43)  (23.05)  (9.88)  (61.35) 
Urban n 397  378  394  375 
 τ1 -0.24  -0.48  -0.60  -0.92 
  (1.88)  (0.91)  (2.15)  (0.98) 
Suburban, Town, or Rural n 338  337  329  328 
 τ1 -0.50  -0.17  -1.22  -0.81 
  (1.37)  (0.90)  (14.06)  (2.04) 
Difference τ2 0.26  -0.31  0.61  -0.11 
  (2.31)  (1.35)  (14.18)  (2.41) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within riskset. "Religious" schools include all Catholic schools, 
Christian but non-Catholic schools, Muslim schools, and Jewish schools. Estimates that use instruments that do not satisfy Staiger 
and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A7). 
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Table A22.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by school tuition, number of full-time equivalents, and student/teacher ratio, four-
year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Tuition (demeaned, average = $5,510) 
n  599  596  590  587 
Estimated effect at average  -0.05  -0.13  -0.68  -0.73 
  (5.07)  (11.32)  (2.65)  (2.08) 
Interaction (per $1,000)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Full-Time Equivalents (demeaned, average = 21.5) 
n  652  632  643  623 
Estimated effect at average  -0.08  -0.16  -0.93  -0.93 
  (0.66)  (0.54)  (0.88)  (0.92) 
Interaction (per 10 FTE)  -0.16  -0.07  0.15  0.15 
  (0.37)  (0.31)  (0.64)  (0.80) 
Student/Teacher Ratio (demeaned, average = 13.0) 
n  652  632  643  623 
Estimated effect at average  -0.24  -0.20  -0.89  -0.84 
  (0.72)  (0.65)  (0.61)  (0.65) 
Interaction  0.12  0.02  -0.01  -0.09 
  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.16)  (0.21) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A7). 
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Table A23.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by total enrollment and enrollment demographics, four-year impacts for the 2012-
13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Total Enrollment (demeaned, average = 280) 
n  652  632  643  623 
Estimated effect at average  -0.11  -0.17  -0.92  -0.92 
  (1.15)  (0.53)  (1.41)  (1.90) 
Interaction (per 100 students) -0.06  -0.03  0.09  0.07 
  (0.32)  (0.23)  (0.33)  (1.32) 
% African American (demeaned, average = 43.0%) 
n  652  632  643  623 
Estimated effect at average  -0.22  -0.21  -0.71  -0.73 
  (0.62)  (0.59)  (0.60)  (0.48) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  0.04  0.01  -0.09  -0.08 
  (0.24)  (0.16)  (0.43)  (0.14) 
% LSP (demeaned, average = 13.3%) 
n  542  523  536  517 
Estimated effect at average  -0.50  -0.44  -0.80  -0.79 
  (4.51)  (3.42)  (2.70)  (1.49) 
Interaction (per 10pp)  0.68  0.38  0.07  -0.20 
  (5.77)  (4.60)  (3.06)  (4.41) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A7). 
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Table A24.         
         
Variation in LATE estimates by instructional intensity, four-year impacts for the 2012-13 cohort 
    ELA 
 Math 
  Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 
 Simple  
Student 
Characteristics 







Days per school year (demeaned, average = 179.1) 
n  652  632  643  623 
Estimated effect at average  -0.25  -0.31  -0.95  -0.94 
  (25.13)  (1.03)  (13.41)  (3.39) 
Interaction (per 10 days)  0.29  0.34  0.14  0.13 
  (298.17)  (22.51)  (169.98)  (56.02) 
Hours per school day (demeaned, average = 7.1) 
n  652  632  643  623 
Estimated effect at average  -0.16  -0.19  -0.89  -0.89 
  (15.71)  (0.60)  (2.41)  (0.59) 
Interaction  0.55  0.69  -0.09  0.15 
  (7.84)  (0.74)  (1.56)  (0.62) 
Total instructional hours (demeaned, average = 1,275.5) 
n  652  632  643  623 
Estimated effect at average  -0.21  -0.26  -0.89  -0.91 
  (4.32)  (0.65)  (1.30)  (0.58) 
Interaction (per 100 hours)  0.20  0.24  0.00  0.06 
  (0.80)  (0.48)  (0.34)  (0.26) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors account for clustering within risk set. Estimates that use instruments that do not 
satisfy Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb for a strong instrument are shaded in gray (see Appendix Table A7). 
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